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1. INTRODUCTION  
The Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994 drew international 
attention to the plight of Mexico’s indigenous farmers, and 
highlighted their opposition to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and to the neoliberal restructuring of 
Mexico’s economy of which the agreement was a part.1  While U.S. 
and Mexican government officials argued that NAFTA would 
create jobs in Mexico and reduce illegal immigration to the United 
States,2
 
1 See generally Leonard Cavise, NAFTA Rebellion: How the Small Village of 
Chiapas is Fighting for Its Life, 21 HUM. RTS. 36 (1994) (explaining the uprising in 
Chiapas as an indigenous response to NAFTA and to Mexico’s ongoing agrarian 
crisis); Andy Gutierrez, Codifying the Past, Erasing the Future: NAFTA and the 
Zapatista Uprising of 1994, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 143 (1996–1998) 
(assessing the Zapatistas’ claim that NAFTA threatens the survival of Mexico’s 
indigenous peasants); Tim Golden, Mexican Troops Battling Rebels; Toll at Least 57, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994, at A1 (describing the battle between armed peasants and 
Mexican government troops in Chiapas just after the effective date of NAFTA); 
Tim Golden, In Remote Mexican Village, Roots of Rebellion Are Bared, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
17, 1994, at A1 (describing a rebel uprising in Rizo de Oro, Mexico as the 
consquence of failed government anti-poverty programs, changes in land tenure 
laws, and the coming into force of NAFTA). 
 the Zapatista rebels regarded NAFTA as the codification of 
economic policies that marginalized and impoverished Mexico’s 
2 See JOHN J. AUDLEY ET AL., NAFTA’S PROMISE AND REALITY: LESSONS FROM 
MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE 11, 39–40 (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf (concluding that NAFTA failed 
to live up to its promise of creating jobs in Mexico and curbing illegal immigration 
to the United States). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/1
GONZALEZ.DOC 3/18/2011  3:16 PM 
2011] MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS 725 
rural indigenous communities.3  In hindsight, the Zapatistas’ 
hostility to NAFTA proved well-grounded.  Far from promoting 
Mexican prosperity, NAFTA devastated rural livelihoods, 
increased unemployment, and accelerated migration to the United 
States.4  Despite the growing militarization of the U.S.-Mexican 
border, the number of Mexicans migrating to the United States 
climbed steadily from approximately 350,000 per year before 
NAFTA to 500,000 per year by the early 2000s.5  An increasing 
proportion of Mexican migrants are indigenous.6
Notwithstanding the substantial scholarly literature on the 
relationship between globalization and migration,
 
7
 
3 See Gutierrez, supra note 1, at 145–49 (discussing the Zapatistas’ view of 
NAFTA as the death knell of indigenous peasants and chronicling the roots of 
Mexico’s agricultural crisis); Cavise, supra note 1, at 36 (examining how and why 
NAFTA will harm the indigenous population of southern Mexico). 
 the 
4 See ARMANDO NAVARRO, THE IMMIGRATION CRISIS: NATIVISM, ARMED 
VIGILANTISM, AND THE RISE OF A COUNTERVAILING MOVEMENT 126–27 (2009) 
(highlighting the specific ways NAFTA harmed Mexico’s poor population and 
spurred migration to the United States); EDUARDO ZEPEDA ET AL., CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE: POLICY OUTLOOK, RETHINKING TRADE POLICY FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM MEXICO UNDER NAFTA 10–13 (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta_trade_development.pdf (discussing 
NAFTA’s failure to improve Mexico’s overall employment rate). 
5 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 13. 
6 See Jonathan Fox & Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, Building Civil Society Among 
Indigenous Migrants, in INDIGENOUS MEXICAN MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 6–
7, 10 (Jonathan Fox & Gaspar Rivera-Salgado eds., 2004) (discussing the growing 
number of indigenous Mexican migrants in the United States and detailing the 
various states where they settle and seek employment); LYNN STEPHEN, 
TRANSBORDER LIVES: INDIGENOUS OAXACANS IN MEXICO, CALIFORNIA, AND OREGON 
242 (2007).  While Mexican immigrants in the United States are generally 
presumed to be ethnically homogeneous, census figures belie this assumption.  In 
spite of ambiguities in census racial categories and persistent undercounting in 
migrant communities, over 407,000 individuals self-identified as Hispanic 
American Indians in the 2000 census as opposed to Hispanics of black, white, or 
mixed race.  Most were of Mexican and Guatemalan ancestry, including Mayan, 
Zapotec, Mixtec, Triqui, and P’urépecha peoples.  Javier Huizar Murillo & Isidro 
Cerda, Indigenous Mexican Migrants in the 2000 U.S. Census: “Hispanic American 
Indians”, in INDIGENOUS MEXICAN MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 281–83. 
7 See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Migration and Social Regionalism: Labour Migration 
as an Unintended Consequence of Globalization in Mexico, in SOCIAL REGIONALISM IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Adelle Blackett & Christian Lévesque eds., forthcoming 
2011) (“[E]conomic dislocation in Mexico arose out of a series of macroeconomic 
reforms geared towards ‘market liberalization,’ of which the adoption of [sic] 
NAFTA was a central feature.”); Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and 
Opening the Door: Mobility, Adjustment, and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 341, 344 (2007) (proposing foreign assistance and massive investment 
in Mexican infrastructure and social capital as a means of reducing illegal 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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immigration debate in the United States has largely focused on 
national security and border enforcement rather than making an 
explicit connection between the economic and ecological 
dislocations caused by globalization and the influx of migrants into 
the United States.8  Similarly, the debate on trade and investment 
in the Americas has paid scant attention to the impact of trade 
liberalization on indigenous peoples despite the growing scholarly 
engagement with this issue.9  These omissions are troubling 
because NAFTA continues to serve as a template for trade 
agreements in the Americas, including the U.S.-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”), the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement, 
and the proposed free trade agreements with Colombia and 
Panama.10
 
immigration); Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic 
Gains from the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371 
(1998–1999) (arguing that immigration restrictions should be regarded as trade 
barriers that distort the price of labor and produce economic inefficiency); Philip 
L. Martin, Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA, 3 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 419, 422–24 (1998–1999) (discussing the relationship between 
trade liberalization and migration with particular emphasis on the impact of 
NAFTA); Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican 
Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937 (1994) (analyzing the 
highly charged debate over trade and immigration occasioned by NAFTA). 
  Unless this template is fundamentally restructured, 
future trade agreements may simply replicate throughout the 
Western hemisphere the economic, ecological, and social 
dislocations experienced under NAFTA.  This Article critiques the 
theoretical underpinnings of contemporary trade agreements from 
an environmental justice perspective using the Mexican 
8 DORI STONE, BEYOND THE FENCE: A JOURNEY TO THE ROOTS OF THE MIGRATION 
CRISIS, at xii–xiii (2009). 
9 Valerie J. Phillips, Identifying National and International Vacuums Potentially 
Impacting NAFTA and Indigenous Peoples, 2 ESTEY CTR J. INT’L L. & TRADE POL’Y 246, 
247 (2001) (lamenting the lack of attention to the impact of “NAFTA on 
indigenous peoples and their business interests”); see, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, 
Trade and Foreign Investment in the Americas: The Impact on Indigenous Peoples and the 
Environment, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 139, 139 (2006) (noting that scholars have 
raised subsidiary questions beyond the central question about “the impact of 
international trade and foreign investment on the environment and on indigenous 
peoples”). 
10 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 2; see TRAVIS MCARTHUR & TODD TUCKER, 
PUB. CITIZEN, A YEAR AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PERU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 
U.S. AND PERU LEFT WITH BROKEN PROMISES AND NO NEW TRADE MODEL (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/PeruFTA-OneYear.pdf (discussing the 
deterioration of environmental and labor conditions in Peru in the wake of the 
U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/1
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agricultural sector under NAFTA as a case study.  The Article 
examines the impact of globalization on the livelihoods of Mexico’s 
rural indigenous peoples, the intersection of social inequality and 
natural resource degradation, and the ways in which these 
phenomena promote migration within Mexico and ultimately to 
the United States.  The Article uses the Mexican experience to 
illuminate the theoretical and practical limitations of the theory of 
comparative advantage in order to lay the groundwork for more 
just and equitable policy alternatives.  While the article focuses on 
trade liberalization in the Mexican agricultural sector, it examines 
this reform in the context of the larger restructuring of the Mexican 
economy along neoliberal lines, including deregulation, 
privatization of industry and government services, reduction of 
government spending, financial liberalization, promotion of direct 
foreign investment, and enhanced protection of private property 
rights.11
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part 2 defines environmental 
justice, explains what it means to evaluate trade policy from an 
environmental justice perspective, and discusses the laws and 
policies that have historically marginalized Mexico’s indigenous 
peoples.  Part 3 introduces the theory of comparative advantage 
and discusses its relevance to contemporary debates over trade 
liberalization.  Part 4 examines the socioeconomic and 
environmental consequences of Mexico’s neoliberal economic 
reforms, focusing on the impact of these reforms on the livelihoods 
and natural resources of Mexico’s indigenous rural communities.  
Part 5 discusses the limitations of the theory of comparative 
advantage based on the lessons of the Mexican experience.  Part 6 
uses the paradigm of environmental justice to propose more just 
and sustainable policy alternatives. 
 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TRADE AGREEMENTS 
The environmental justice movement in the United States 
emerged in the 1980s as a grassroots response to the 
disproportionate concentration of environmental hazards in low-
income communities and communities of color.12
 
11 See LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 18 (John 
Williamson ed., 1990) (setting forth the key elements of the neoliberal economic 
model). 
  As the full extent 
12 See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: 
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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of environmental injustice became known, the environmental 
justice movement expanded to encompass additional 
environmental issues, including access to parks and open space, 
exposure to toxic pesticides and contaminated fish, inequities in 
disaster preparedness and emergency response, and the 
development, management and use of natural resources in ways 
that disadvantage poor people and people of color.13
Analogous environmental movements in the Global South have 
engaged in grassroots struggles over pollution, over degradation of 
natural resources, and over access to the ecological necessities of 
life (food, water, and land).
 
14  While the types of environmental 
problems addressed by these struggles have varied, what these 
movements have in common is the types of communities that have 
been involved—communities disadvantaged by high levels of 
poverty and by other forms of social marginalization.15  These 
communities view the environmental struggle as part of a larger 
struggle for social and economic justice.16
Indigenous peoples occupy an important and unique position 
in domestic and international environmental justice struggles.  
While indigenous peoples are often burdened by environmental 
hazards similar to those borne by other marginalized communities, 
 
 
20–33 (2001) (describing the origins of the environmental justice movement in the 
United States). 
13 See David H. Getches & David N. Pellow, Beyond “Traditional” 
Environmental Justice, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, 
AND APPLICATIONS 3–5 (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002) (introducing the 
concept of environmental justice and discussing its evolution over time); CTR. FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AN UNNATURAL DISASTER: THE AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE 
KATRINA 34–40 (Sept. 2005), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles 
/Unnatural_Disaster_512.pdf (discussing how environmental disasters have a 
particularly negative impact on the poor, using Katrina as an example). 
14 See RAMACHANDRA GUHA, ENVIRONMENTALISM: A GLOBAL HISTORY 98–108 
(2000) (describing environmental movements within poor communities outside of 
Western Europe and North America). 
15 See id. at 105–06 (describing the particular characteristics of the 
“environmentalism of the poor”); Getches & Pellow, supra note 13, at 16–17 
(proposing a working definition of environmental justice that expands the types 
of environmental justice issues, while narrowing the communities entitled to 
make environmental justice claims, namely poor people, people of color, and 
tribal communities). 
16 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 12, at 33 (“[M]ost environmental justice 
activists have a social justice orientation, seeing environmental degradation as just 
one of many ways their communities are under attack.”); GUHA, supra note 14, at 
105 (“[Environmentalism of the poor] combines a concern for the environment 
with an often more visible concern for social justice.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/1
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indigenous peoples possess distinctive rights as the original 
inhabitants of colonized lands who retain their unique political and 
cultural identity.17  The primary demand of indigenous 
environmental movements has been territorial sovereignty and 
economic, political, and cultural self-determination.18  In the 
United States, for example, federally recognized Indian tribes 
exercise sovereign control over their territories, and environmental 
justice struggles have sought to protect and enhance tribal 
regulatory authority over land use, environmental protection, and 
economic development on reservation lands.19  At the international 
level, native peoples have sought recognition and protection under 
both domestic and international law of their rights to make 
decisions over the lands and natural resources that they have 
traditionally used and occupied.20  Indigenous environmental 
movements have emphasized the unique spiritual, cultural, and 
economic relationship between native peoples and their ancestral 
territories as well as the importance of indigenous lands for 
economic and cultural survival.21
 
17 See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: the Impact of 
Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1653–54 (2007) (explaining that 
indigenous peoples are distinctive because of their status as the “original” 
inhabitants of the lands they occupy and that their rights therefore cannot be 
coextensive with those of any other group). 
  
18 See id. at 1629–33, 1652–56 (observing that “equality of status” as 
governments is the key environmental justice demand of native peoples rather 
than the “equality of citizenship” that has been emphasized by civil rights-based 
environmental justice movements on behalf of other poor communities and 
communities of color); Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing 
Environmental Justice, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 311, 333–41 (2001) (explaining why a 
one-size-fits-all environmental justice framework is a disservice to Native 
Americans). 
19 See Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Sovereignty and Environmental Justice, in JUSTICE 
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 13, at 161–64 (describing the history and 
extent of Native American tribal sovereignty, and the environmental justice 
concerns that have arisen in relation to tribal lands). 
20 See S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams Jr., The Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 34-38, 53-75 (2001) (discussing the 
achievements of the modern indigenous rights movement, including the 
recognition under international and domestic law of indigenous peoples’ rights 
over their traditional lands and resources). 
21 See Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1654–57 (arguing for indigenous rights to 
environmental self-determination based on territorial sovereignty, cultural 
relationship with the land, social justice or equal rights principles, and individual 
tribal members’ rights to cultural survival); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental 
Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics,  and Traditional 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Latin America has a long history of environmental justice 
struggles.22  The most prominent struggles are the efforts of 
indigenous peoples to resist the exploitation of their lands by 
extractive industries.23  However, as trade liberalization 
increasingly threatens the livelihoods and natural resources of 
socially and economically disenfranchised communities, trade 
policy has emerged as an important environmental justice issue.24  
National and transnational organizations representing small 
farmers and indigenous peoples have been particularly active in 
Latin American debates and protests about trade policy.25
 
Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 274–86 (1996) (describing the elements of 
an indigenous land ethic).  While recognizing the diversity among native peoples, 
Professor Tsosie integrates the literature on traditional indigenous world views 
and identifies four important aspects of indigenous communities’ cultural and 
spiritual connection to the natural world:  
  Indeed, 
the Zapatista uprising of 1994 is an example of fierce opposition by 
indigenous communities to NAFTA and to the neoliberal 
a perception of the earth as an animate being; a belief that humans are in 
a kinship system with other living things; a perception of the land as 
essential to the identity of the people; and a concept of reciprocity and 
balance that extends to relationships among humans, including future 
generations, and between humans and the natural world. 
Id. at 276. 
22 See Peter Newell, Contesting Trade Politics in the Americas: The Politics of 
Environmental Justice, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS, 
PROMISE, AND PRACTICE 49, 51 (David V. Carruthers ed., 2008) (recognizing Latin 
America’s long history of environmental justice struggles, whether or not these 
struggles are described in such terms). 
23 See id. at 51 (explaining how trade liberalization has engendered conflicts 
with indigenous peoples and campesinos over access to lands and resources). 
24 See id. at 51–56 (describing the diverse social movements that have 
opposed trade liberalization in the Americas under the banner of environmental 
justice); see also INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Alf Hornborg 
& Andrew K. Jorgenson eds., 2010) (examining the environmental consequences 
of international trade through an environmental justice paradigm); Carmen G. 
Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78 
DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (2001) (using the framework of environmental justice to 
analyze the North-South distribution of the environmental costs of trade 
liberalization). 
25 See COURTNEY JUNG, THE MORAL FORCE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS: CRITICAL 
LIBERALISM AND THE ZAPATISTAS 206–07 (2008) (describing the national and 
transnational alliances of indigenous and peasant organizations that have 
emerged in Latin America in opposition to globalization); Newell, Contesting Trade 
Politics in the Americas, supra note 22, at 56 (discussing the growing role of 
indigenous peoples’ organizations in regional debates over trade policy).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/1
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development strategies that threaten indigenous lands, livelihoods, 
and lifeways.26
In order to understand indigenous opposition to NAFTA, it is 
useful to examine the official Mexican policy toward indigenous 
peoples and their lands from the period of colonialism through the 
entry into force of NAFTA. 
 
Mexico has over ten million indigenous inhabitants, a figure 
that represents ten to fourteen percent of the nation’s population 
and nearly one-third of the indigenous population of Latin 
America.27  Despite the formal equality bestowed by Mexican law, 
Mexico’s native population suffers from high rates of poverty, 
malnutrition, and illiteracy.28  In 1990, for example, eighty percent 
of indigenous Mexicans lived below the poverty line—as 
compared to only eighteen percent of their non-indigenous 
counterparts.29
The subordinate status of Mexico’s indigenous population is a 
function of a complex set of laws and policies that marginalized 
native communities and dispossessed them of their lands.  Mexican 
policy toward indigenous communities can be divided into three 
distinct phases: the colonial era; the century from independence to 
the Revolution (1812-1910); and the post-Revolutionary period.
 
30
During the colonial era, the Spanish Crown secured indigenous 
acquiescence to the colonial project by recognizing indigenous land 
 
 
26 See Newell, Contesting Trade Politics in the Americas, supra note 22, at 57 
(“Indeed, the Zapatista movement is in many ways a product of the effect of neo-
liberal reforms on the rural poor in Mexico . . . .”). 
27 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 107 (“Roughly 10 percent of Mexico’s 
population—just over 10 million people—are indigenous.”); DEBORAH J. YASHAR, 
CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA: THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS 
AND POSTLIBERAL CHALLENGE 20–21 (2005) (explaining that ten to fourteen percent 
of Mexico’s population is indigenous and that approximately thirty percent of 
Latin America’s total indigenous population resides in Mexico); Derek A. Smith et 
al., The Certification and Privatization of Indigenous Lands in Mexico, 8 J. LAT. AM. 
GEOGRAPHY 175, 176 (2009) (“[T]he total number of indigenous people is likely at 
least 10 million people out of a total population of 103 million.”).  Mexico’s 
indigenous population most likely exceeds official figures because Mexico has, 
until very recently, classified as indigenous only those who speak an indigenous 
language as opposed to those who self-identity as ethnically indigenous.  See Fox 
& Rivera-Salgado, supra note 6, at 2. 
28 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 94-96, 107 (concluding that the Mexican 
government’s policy of “equality through assimilation” failed to improve the 
living standards of indigenous Mexicans).  
29 See id. at 107 (providing statistics on indigenous poverty, malnutrition, 
illiteracy, and lack of access to electricity and drinking water). 
30 Id. at 80. 
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rights and permitting indigenous communities a certain degree of 
autonomy.31  Nevertheless, the Indians were regarded as 
uncivilized, inferior beings in need of tutelage,32 and their lands 
were gradually appropriated by the colonizers through a variety of 
legal and extra-legal means.33  By the end of the seventeenth 
century, the Spanish colonizers had acquired legal title to over half 
of Mexico’s arable and grazing land.34
After independence, the new legal order extended citizenship 
rights to all Mexicans and incorporated the semi-autonomous 
indigenous communities into municipal governments.
 
35  Mexican 
liberals sought to erase indigenous identity by promoting 
assimilation and miscegenation.36  The government regarded 
communally held indigenous lands as obstacles to progress and 
proceeded to privatize these lands—producing an unprecedented 
concentration of landholding and an army of landless peasants.37  
By 1911, ninety-five percent of Mexico’s rural population was 
landless.38
The dispossession of Mexico’s rural population and the 
consolidation of landholding in the hands of the rural elite laid the 
groundwork for the Mexican Revolution.
 
39
 
31 See id. at 82–83 (describing the Spanish colonial administration’s policy of 
indigenous “autonomy”). 
  Both Emiliano Zapata 
32 See id. at 83 (explaining that, despite the “autonomy” given to indigenous 
communities, they were still seen as inferior and in need of special protection and 
were therefore denied equal legal status). 
33 See Willem Assies, Land Tenure Regimes in Mexico: An Overview, 8 J. 
AGRARIAN CHANGE 33, 36 (2008) (describing the various forms of expropriation of 
native lands by colonizers including: “mercedes (royal land grants), . . . 
composiciones (confirmations of de facto land occupation), sales or outright 
usurpation”). 
34 Id. 
35 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 83–84 (explaining that the 1812 Mexican 
Constitution eliminated legal distinctions between indigenous and non-
indigenous Mexicans and replaced indigenous “autonomy” with “ethnically blind 
municipal governments”). 
36 See id. at 85 (“The . . . attitude toward Mexico’s indigenous population was 
that it would soon disappear; it would be incorporated into the Mexican national 
identity through assimilation and miscegenation.”). 
37 See id. at 86–87 (explaining how Indian lands, like church lands, were 
“entailed and held corporately”); Assies, supra note 33, at 37–38 (describing how 
indigenous land holdings were considered impediments to progress, leading to 
legal reforms that facilitated the acquisition of these lands by large landowners). 
38 JUNG, supra note 25, at 90. 
39 See id. at 87 (describing the Mexican Revolution as a “backlash against . . . 
the concentration of land in the hands of wealthy hacendados and foreigners.”). 
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and Pancho Villa advocated the confiscation of the vast rural 
estates and the return of land to Mexico’s impoverished rural 
dwellers.40  Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution authorized 
the expropriation of large landholdings and introduced the ejido 
system as a means of returning land to indigenous communities 
and distributing land to the rural poor.41  Ejido land was 
communally owned land allocated by the state that could be 
inherited, but could not be rented, sold, or mortgaged.42  Although 
the land redistribution process was complicated and protracted, 
more than half of Mexico’s lands belonged to ejidos by 1990.43
Notwithstanding the significant material benefits conferred by 
the redistribution of land, the agrarian reforms stopped short of 
restoring the colonial-era administrative and political autonomy of 
indigenous communities.
 
44  Ruling elites continued to regard 
indigenous peoples as backward and inferior and promoted the 
“modernization” of the indigenous population through education, 
assimilation, and integration into Mexican mestizo culture—even as 
they exalted and romanticized Mexico’s indigenous past.45
 
40 See id. (explaining that both Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapato garnered 
support for the Mexican Revolution by championing the land rights of 
campesinos). 
 
41 See MARIÁ TERESA VÁZQUEZ CASTILLO, LAND PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO: 
URBANIZATION, FORMATION OF REGIONS, AND GLOBALIZATION IN EJIDOS 30–31 (2004) 
(explaining that Article 27 was enacted to regulate land ownership and 
redistribution in Mexico and how it enacted the ejido system to meet those goals).  
The full text of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution is set forth in Volume V, No. 30 
of the Mexican Constitution.  Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, 150–51, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], Organo 
del Gobierno Provisional de la República Mexicana, 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), 
available at http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=219102. 
42 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 89. 
Ejido land was allocated by the state, could neither be bought nor sold, 
and was communally owned and farmed.  Ejido land could be passed 
down to heirs, but if any individual or family was unable to farm his 
portion, . . . the land would pass along to another ejido member. 
Id.; Pete Brown, Institutions, Inequalities, and the Impact of Agrarian Reform on Rural 
Mexican Communities, 56 HUMAN ORG. 102, 103 (1997) (explaining the restrictions 
on ejido lands). 
43 Brown, supra note 42, at 102. 
44 JUNG, supra note 25, at 92. 
45 See id. at 94–97 (discussing the development of Mexican indigenous policy); 
JOSEPH COTTER, TROUBLED HARVEST: AGRONOMY AND REVOLUTION IN MEXICO, 1880–
2002, at 6–8 (2003) (describing the Mexican government’s long-standing efforts to 
“modernize” peasant agriculture through a cultural campaign designed to 
transform the practices and beliefs of campesinos, indigenous communities, and 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
GONZALEZ.DOC 3/18/2011  3:16 PM 
734 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:3 
The next major shift in Mexican agricultural policy was the 
Green Revolution, which commenced in 1950 but had its roots in 
earlier efforts to “modernize” the agricultural sector with U.S. 
technical assistance.46  Financed by the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations, the Green Revolution sought to reduce hunger by 
increasing food production through genetically uniform seeds that 
produced higher yields than traditional varieties in response to the 
application of controlled irrigation, chemical fertilizers, and 
pesticides.47  While the Green Revolution was successful from the 
standpoint of food production, it primarily benefited wealthy 
farmers because poor farmers lacked the resources to purchase the 
improved seeds, agrochemicals, and irrigation equipment required 
to generate high yields.48  Furthermore, as global agricultural 
output increased, agricultural commodity prices plummeted, 
thereby undermining the precarious livelihoods of small farmers 
and swelling the ranks of the rural poor.49  Far from improving the 
well-being of the rural and indigenous communities that struggled 
alongside Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, the Green Revolution 
triggered an exodus of poor farmers from the countryside to the 
shanty towns of Mexico’s cities and ultimately to the United States.  
Even the Mexican government’s massive investment in agricultural 
programs from 1970 to 1982 could not stop the mass migration.50
 
other subalterns that the government and its technical personnel regarded as 
backward and inferior). 
 
46 See COTTER, supra note 45, at 233–79 (describing the origins and course of 
the Green Revolution). 
47 See GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 44–65 (1997) (discussing the origins of the Green Revolution 
and evaluating its successes and failures); COTTER, supra note 45, at 251 (explaining 
that the Green Revolution sought to increase food production and to modernize 
Third World agriculture through high-yield seeds and agrochemicals); KEITH 
GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 146–47 (2d ed. 
1990) (discussing the high-yielding food grains developed and disseminated 
under the auspices of the Green Revolution). 
48 See COTTER, supra note 45, at 12 (“[M]ost campesinos could not use the new 
technologies because they required . . . irrigation, chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides, and the annual purchase of seed that they could not afford . . . .”). 
49 See GRIFFIN, supra note 47, at 159–60 (discussing the mixed benefits of the 
early Green Revolution); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, 
and the Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 443 (2004) (“Indeed, one of the major 
unintended consequences of the Green Revolution was the dispossession of many 
small farmers in the developing world.”). 
50 See COTTER, supra note 45, at 263, 301–03 (discussing the flight of campesinos 
to Mexican cities as a consequence of the Green Revolution). 
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The final stage of Mexico’s agricultural transformation began 
with the debt crisis of 1982, which inaugurated decades of free 
market economic reforms that compromised the ability of the 
Mexican state to provide subsidies, credit, crop insurance, and 
other services to indigenous rural communities.51  The Mexican 
government adopted an export-oriented agricultural development 
strategy that favored large agro-exporters.52  Seeking yet again to 
“modernize” the agricultural sector, the government amended 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution in 1992 to permit the 
privatization of ejidos and to abolish the government’s 
Constitutional obligation to redistribute land.53  Viewing the 
abolition of land reform and the impending entry into force of 
NAFTA as threats to their economic and cultural survival, the 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National 
Liberation Army), a coalition of indigenous peasants in Chiapas, 
exploded into open rebellion.54
One of the key demands of the Zapatista rebels was democratic 
dialogue over the changes to Article 27 and over NAFTA.
 
55
 
51 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 138 (describing the neoliberal economic reforms 
adopted by the Salinas administration (1988–94) under pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund and the United States); Gutierrez, supra note 1, at 
149–52 (explaining that the debt crisis of 1982 ushered in a series of free market 
reforms that eliminated state agricultural subsidies, price guarantees, and 
government assistance). 
  The 
Zapatistas pointed out that the privatization of the ejidos and the 
decision to enter into NAFTA had occurred without prior 
52 See Gisele Henriques & Raj Patel, Agricultural Trade Liberalization and 
Mexico 16 (Food First: Inst. for Food & Dev. Pol’y, Policy Brief No. 7, 2003) 
(discussing the Mexican government’s shift in agricultural policy).   
53 See Assies, supra note 33, at 51–52 (summarizing the amendments to Article 
27 of the Mexican Constitution).  The revised text of Article 27 is set forth in the 
Constitución Politíca de los Estados Unidos Méxicanos [C.P.], as amended, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de febrero de 1917 (Mex.), available at 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/rc121.pdf. 
54 See Marco Palau, The Struggle for Dignity, Land, and Autonomy: The Rights of 
Mexico’s Indigenous People a Decade After the Zapatista Revolt, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 427, 437–41 (2005) (explaining the factors that precipitated the Zapatista 
uprising); David P. Kelly, Trading Indigenous Rights: The NAFTA Side Agreements as 
an Impetus for Human Rights Enforcement, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 113, 126–29 
(2000) (describing the circumstances that led to the Zapatista revolt). 
55 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 198 (explaining that democratization was one of 
the eleven demands put forth by the Zapatistas on January 2, 1994). 
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consultation with indigenous and rural communities.56  By calling 
for democratization, representation, and self-determination, the 
indigenous movement transcended the politics of patronage and 
sought instead to transform state-society relations.57
Environmental justice advocates have long called for the 
democratization of trade policy and have demanded that trade 
negotiations be open to a wide variety of participants and points of 
view.
 
58
3. THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: AN INTRODUCTION 
  However, the technical nature of trade agreements and 
their grounding in economic theory can inhibit meaningful public 
participation.  This Article seeks to promote debate over the 
purpose, pace, extent, and appropriateness of trade liberalization 
by examining the limitations of the economic theories that underlie 
contemporary trade agreements and by using the Mexican case 
study to ground the critique in social and economic reality.  The 
Article does not purport to address all of the limitations of 
neoclassical trade theory or to break new ground in economic 
thought.  Rather, the goal is to highlight several myths and 
misconceptions regarding the theory of comparative advantage 
that are particularly relevant to the plight of rural indigenous 
communities in the Americas. 
The theory of comparative advantage plays a central role in 
legitimating both the ideology of free trade and the economic 
policy recommendations of the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”).59
 
56 See id. (quoting Comandante Tacho who described the Zapatistas’ 
grievances and their demand for indigenous participation in national policy 
making). 
  Developed by David Ricardo, the theory of comparative 
advantage posits that each country should specialize in the goods 
that it produces relatively more efficiently and should import the 
57 See id. at 200–01 (describing the demands of the Zapatista rebels). 
58 See Newell, supra note 22, at 59 (“[I]t is unsurprising that there have been 
calls to democratize trade policy in Latin America, to open it up to a plurality of 
participants, interests and agendas, and to revisit fundamentally the question of 
who and what trade is for.”). 
59 See PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 630 (11th ed. 1980) (illustrating the theory 
of comparative advantage); Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: 
The Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles 
of Political Economy, 69 U. MO.-K.C. L. REV. 733, 750–56 (2001) (explaining that the 
ideology and institutions of globalization depend upon the theory of comparative 
advantage for their legitimacy). 
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goods that it produces relatively less efficiently.60  For example, 
countries with abundant natural resources and scarce capital 
should specialize in agricultural exports and should import 
manufactured goods.61  Furthermore, subsidies and tariffs are 
inefficient because they distort comparative advantage and 
encourage countries to produce goods in which they do not have a 
comparative advantage and which might be produced more 
cheaply elsewhere.62
Global agricultural trade is currently distorted by high levels of 
protectionism in industrialized countries.
  In order to elucidate the relevance of the 
theory of comparative advantage to contemporary debates over 
trade policy, it is useful to summarize the ongoing controversy 
over international trade in agricultural products. 
63  The lavish agricultural 
subsidies provided by the United States and the European Union 
to domestic farmers encourage overproduction and depress world 
market prices for agricultural commodities.64  Many agricultural 
commodities are being sold in world markets at below the cost of 
production, thereby undermining the livelihoods of poor farmers 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.65
 
60 See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION 133–34 (3rd ed. 1821), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE 
OF DAVID RICARDO 133–34 (Piero Sraffa ed., 1951) (explaining the theory).  The 
theory of comparative advantage explains why it would be beneficial for two 
countries to engage in trade even though one of the countries might possess an 
absolute advantage (greater efficiency) in every item it produces.  According to 
the theory of comparative advantage, the more efficient country is better served 
by specializing in the goods it produces most efficiently and importing the goods 
that it produces relatively less efficiently.  For excellent examples of this 
proposition, see Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics 
of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 50–53 (1998). 
  For example, the United 
61 But see Fred P. Gale, Economic Specialization Versus Ecological Diversification: 
The Trade Policy Implications of Taking the Ecosystem Approach Seriously, 34 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 285, 288–90 (2000) (explaining and critiquing the application of 
neoclassical trade theory’s principle of specialization to natural resources). 
62 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 808–16 (7th ed. 1998) (describing the inefficiency of tariffs and subsidies). 
63 See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS, AID, TRADE AND SECURITY IN AN 
UNEQUAL WORLD 129 (2005) [hereinafter UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2005] (“The problem at the heart of the Doha Round negotiations can be 
summarized in three words: rich country subsidies.”). 
64 See id. at 130–32 (describing the protectionist agricultural policies of the 
United States and the European Union). 
65 See OXFAM INT’L, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, 
GLOBALISATION, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 114–17 (2002), available at 
http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/report_english.pdf (reviewing 
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States exports wheat, rice, corn, cotton, and soybeans at prices 
ranging from ten percent to forty-seven percent below the cost of 
production.66  Moreover, tariffs on imported agricultural products 
imposed by industrialized countries limit the ability of developing 
country exporters to obtain access to the lucrative domestic 
markets of the United States, the European Union, and other 
developed nations.67  According to the International Food Policy 
Research Institute, the revenue foregone by developing countries 
as a consequence of industrialized country subsidies and import 
barriers is $24 billion per year.68
Despite its stated objective of creating a “fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system,” the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture permits many of the subsidies and tariff barriers 
maintained by developed countries.
 
69
 
data on trade subsidies and describing the negative economic, social, and 
environmental consequences of current policy); Sophia Murphy et. al., WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture: A Decade of Dumping (Inst. Agric. & Trade Pol’y, Paper 
No. 1, 2005), available at http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountID 
=451&refid=48532 (analyzing the global effects of U.S. agricultural dumping). 
  By contrast, many 
developing countries have been obligated to open their markets to 
foreign competition as a consequence of structural adjustment 
66 Murphy et al., supra note 65, at 2. 
67 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement 
on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 
460–63 (2002) (explaining how wealthy countries evaded the market access 
requirements of the Agreement on Agriculture and maintained high tariffs on 
agricultural products from developing country). 
68 XINSHEN DIAO ET AL., INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST., HOW MUCH DOES IT HURT? 
THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/media/trade/trade 
.pdf. 
69 Agreement on Agriculture pmbl., para. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 410 (1995) [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture] (declaring that the 
objective of the agreement was “to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system”); see Gonzalez, supra note 67, at 459–68 (describing 
how the market access, export subsidy, and domestic subsidy provisions of the 
Agreement on Agriculture perpetuate many of the pre-existing distortions and 
inequities in world agricultural trade that favor agricultural producers in wealthy 
countries); OXFAM, DUMPING WITHOUT BORDERS: HOW US AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
ARE DESTROYING THE LIVELIHOODS OF MEXICAN CORN FARMERS, 10–14 (Oxfam, 
Briefing Paper No. 50, 2003), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources 
/policy/trade/downloads/bp50_corn.pdf (describing how various aspects of 
U.S. agricultural policy undermine the stated purpose of the Agreement on 
Agriculture by strengthening the economic position of American agribusiness 
through production subsidies and export subsidies that are exempt from WTO 
restrictions). 
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programs mandated by the IMF and the World Bank pursuant to 
conditions in loan agreements.70  The legal rules governing 
international agricultural trade have thus created a highly uneven 
playing field that permits protectionism in wealthy industrialized 
countries while imposing market openness in developing 
countries.71
Agricultural subsidies and import barriers continue to be one 
of the most contentious issues in the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations.
 
72  In September 2003, the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 
Cancun, Mexico, collapsed abruptly when developing countries 
walked out of the negotiations to protest the unwillingness of 
industrialized countries to reduce agricultural subsidies.73  The 
negotiations came to a grinding halt again in 2008 as a consequence 
of unresolved disputes between developed and developing 
countries over agricultural trade.74
Even the World Bank has expressed concern about the 
inequities in global agricultural trade, and has called for the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies and import barriers in both 
developed and developing countries as a means of enabling 
developing countries to combat poverty and to promote economic 
 
 
70 See Gonzalez, supra note 49, at 457–58 (explaining that the structural 
adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank obligated developing countries 
to open their markets to foreign competition without requiring any reduction of 
the subsidies and import barriers maintained by developed countries).  
71 See id. at 457–60, 463–64 (arguing that the neoliberal economic model is 
essentially a system of double standards imposed on poor countries by wealthy 
countries through which the latter maintain their economic dominance); 
Gonzalez, supra note 67, at 446–49, 459–68, 490 (contrasting agricultural policy in 
developed and developing countries and explaining that the Agreement on 
Agriculture enabled developed countries to maintain agricultural tariffs and 
subsidies while requiring market openness in developing countries); OXFAM INT’L, 
supra note 65, at 95–121 (supporting the double standard argument). 
72 See James Kanter, Hopes Fade For Deal to Cut Trade Barriers, N.Y. TIMES INT’L, 
July 2, 2006, at A6 (explaining that conflicts over agricultural trade are the main 
sticking point in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations). 
73 See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at A1 (“[D]elegates from Africa, the Caribbean and Asia 
walked out, accusing wealthy nations of failing to offer sufficient compromises on 
agriculture and other issues.”). 
74 See Heather Stewart, Tariffs: WTO Talks Collapse After India and China Clash 
with America Over Farm Products, THE GUARDIAN, July 30, 2008, at 22, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/30/wto.india (providing an 
account of the collapse of WTO negotiations due primarily to the United States’ 
rejection of developing country proposals to protect small farmers from surges of 
low-price food imports). 
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development by capitalizing on their “comparative advantage” in 
agricultural production.75
Phasing out agricultural protectionism in developed countries 
will certainly produce benefits in developing countries, including 
higher incomes for farmers and enhanced export earnings, but 
these benefits are likely to be captured by a small number of 
countries that are already major agro-exporters, most notably, 
Argentina, Brazil, and China.
  In short, World Bank analysts have 
advocated agro-export specialization as a viable development 
strategy provided that the “playing field” is “leveled” by reducing 
and eventually eliminating tariffs and import barriers. 
76  Small farmers will benefit the least 
because they lack the ability to compete with large-scale industrial 
agricultural producers who are well-integrated into global 
markets.77
4. CASE STUDY: THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS 
  Rather than embracing agricultural trade liberalization 
in both developed and developing countries in accordance with the 
dictates of “comparative advantage,” it is useful to critically 
examine the experiences of developing countries like Mexico in 
order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the theoretical 
and practical limitations of the theory of comparative advantage 
and of the policy prescriptions that emerge there from. 
Beginning in 1982, Mexico embarked upon an economic 
restructuring that has profoundly affected the livelihoods of 
 
75 See M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin, Introduction and Overview, in 
GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 3 (M. Ataman Aksoy 
& John C. Beghin eds., 2005) (“[A] development strategy based on agricultural 
commodity exports is likely to be impoverishing in the current agricultural policy 
environment in which policymakers in many countries have mercantilist and 
protectionist reflexes that, when aggregated, compromise world trade in 
agricultural and food products.”); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2008: AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 11, 103–08, 117 (2007), http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR_00_book.pdf (providing details 
on the current and projected costs of existing agricultural trade policies and 
estimating the impacts of trade reform on both developed and developing 
countries). 
76 See Timothy A. Wise, Promise or Pitfall? The Limited Gains from Agricultural 
Trade Liberalisation for Developing Countries, 36 J. PEASANT STUDIES 855, 860–63 
(2009) (suggesting that phasing out agricultural protectionism in developed 
countries will produce only small gains for developing countries as a whole and 
that these small gains will be concentrated in a limited number of developing 
countries). 
77 See id. at 863 (describing the limited gains small farmers can expect to 
achieve in the global economy). 
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millions of farmers in Mexico’s poorest regions.78  Mexico 
restructured its economy along neoliberal lines in response to 
pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, and subsequently 
accelerated this restructuring in its implementation of NAFTA as 
well as other bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.79  This 
section examines the environmental justice implications of 
Mexico’s neoliberal economic reforms by focusing on the effects of 
trade liberalization in the Mexican corn sector.  Even though the 
Mexican economy is highly diversified, corn production plays an 
important role in the Mexican economy and Mexican society.80  
Corn is the staple of the Mexican diet, the source of livelihood for 
millions of Mexican farmers, and a product widely used in 
traditional medicine and in the religious ceremonies of local and 
indigenous communities.81
4.1. The Significance of the Corn Sector in Mexico and the United 
States 
  Thus, the Mexican corn sector serves as 
a useful vantage point from which to analyze the impact of trade 
liberalization on Mexico’s rural indigenous population and on the 
natural resources upon which this population depends. 
Corn has been cultivated in Mexico for thousands of years, and 
Mexican farmers currently cultivate over forty-one distinct 
landraces and thousands of corn varieties.82
 
78 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 7–8, 14–17 (outlining the events 
leading up to Mexico’s embrace of the neoliberal economic model and describing 
Mexico’s trade agreements since 1982). 
  Corn production 
alone utilizes sixty percent of Mexico’s farmland, employs 
79 See id. at 22 (describing Mexico’s liberalized trade policies). 
80 See id. at 24 (explaining that corn is the single most important commodity 
in Mexico because it is the country’s staple food crop, a major source of 
employment, and a crop that accounts for sixty percent of cultivated land). 
81 See id.; Alejandro Nadal, Zea Mays: Effects of Trade Liberalization of Mexico’s 
Corn Sector, in GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA’S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE 
143, 158 n.2 (Carolyn L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002) (describing the various 
ways that corn is used in the cuisine and religious rituals of Mexican 
communities); Raj Patel & Gisele Henriques, NAFTA, Corn, and Mexico’s 
Agricultural Trade Liberalization, INTERHEMISPHERIC RES. CTR. (IRC) (Feb. 13, 2004), 
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1009 (outlining the socio-economic 
importance and historic role of corn in Mexican society). 
82 See ALEJANDRO NADAL, OXFAM & WORLD WILDLIFE FUND INT’L, THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ON CORN 
PRODUCTION IN MEXICO 4 (2000), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp 
/NadalOxfamWWFMaizeMexico2000.pdf (discussing the background and history 
of Mexico’s corn production). 
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approximately three million farmers (eight percent of the Mexican 
population and forty percent of agricultural workers), and has a 
direct impact on Mexico’s environment (particularly soil 
conservation, water quality and quantity, and agrochemical use).83  
While Mexico does possess modern, industrial corn farms in the 
northern states of Sonora and Sinaloa, most of Mexico’s corn 
production comes from traditional landraces cultivated by peasant 
farmers in southern Mexico from seeds that they save from their 
own crops or obtain from neighbors.84  These seeds are bred to 
withstand different environmental conditions (such as humidity, 
frost, drought, heavy rainfall, variable soil quality, pests, and 
wind).85  Sowing different varieties of corn with different 
characteristics enables farmers to adapt seeds to local conditions 
and to diversify their risk in the event of crop failure.86  This in situ 
conservation of genetic diversity is critical for global food security 
and provides plant breeders with the genetic resources with which 
to develop new varieties that will meet the world’s food needs in 
the twenty-first century.87
 
83 Id. at 4, 11, 43. 
 
84 See Alejandro Nadal & Timothy A. Wise, The Environmental Costs of 
Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Mexico-U.S. Maize Trade Under NAFTA 4–5, 16–17 
(Working Grp. on Dev. and Env. in the Ams., Discussion Paper No. 4, June 2004), 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP04NadalWiseJuly04.pdf (noting that 
although Sinaloa’s share of national production increased dramatically during the 
1990s, much of Mexico’s corn is produced by peasant farmers, despite great 
variation in their use of modern industrial farming methods and interaction with 
commercial markets). 
85 See Nadal, supra note 81, at 144–45 (explaining that corn has “extraordinary 
adaptive capabilities” and can be cultivated in a wide range of climate and soil 
conditions). 
86 See id. at 144 (discussing how farmers hedge risk by planting low yielding, 
early maturing corn as well as high-yielding, late maturing corn in order to deal 
with changing economic and climate conditions, and noting that some 
communities regularly plant at least eight different varieties of corn). 
87 See NADAL, supra note 82, at 4–5, 11 (noting the importance of genetic 
diversity for the survival of Mexican producers and for meeting the world’s food 
demand in the twenty-first century).  Genetically diverse crops enhance the 
resilience of agro-ecosystems because some varieties are better able to resist pests, 
disease, and adverse weather conditions to which other varieties might succumb.  
The dangers of genetic uniformity are best illustrated by the Irish potato famine, 
which resulted in the death of two million people and the migration to the United 
States of an additional two million.  Because the Irish potato crop was genetically 
uniform, a single infestation was sufficient to produce widespread devastation.  
Regrettably, the dramatic erosion of the world’s crop genetic diversity has 
rendered our food system increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic loss.  See also 
CARY FOWLER & PATRICK R. MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF 
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Cultivation of traditional landraces takes place in Mexico’s 
poorest regions and most marginal lands, where seeds have been 
adapted over generations for properties not available in high-yield 
genetically-uniform varieties.88  These regions of genetic diversity 
are also the areas in Mexico with the highest levels of cultural 
diversity.89  The southeastern Mexican states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, 
and Chiapas, where traditional cultivation methods prevail, are 
disproportionately poor and disproportionately populated by 
indigenous communities.90  Regrettably, traditional corn farmers 
are not compensated for their valuable stewardship of genetic 
diversity in this extremely important food crop; nor are they 
compensated for producing corn in ways that are less chemical-
intensive than corn production in the United States or in the large, 
mechanized farms in northern Mexico.91
In the United States, corn is a valuable export commodity.  The 
United States is the world’s leading producer and exporter of corn, 
and corn represents roughly nine percent of the value of all U.S. 
agricultural output.
  The market price of 
Mexican corn does not reflect the positive social and 
environmental externalities associated with its production.  
92  Corn is produced in the United States at 
approximately forty percent below the cost of production in 
Mexico, and U.S. yields are significantly higher than Mexican 
yields.93
 
GENETIC DIVERSITY 41–53, 82–89 (1990) (explaining the importance of genetic 
diversity to the security of the world’s food supply). 
  There are several reasons for these disparities.  First, U.S. 
agricultural producers are highly subsidized—with benefits 
88 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 21–22 (“Traditional agricultural 
practices tend to prevail in more marginal environments, where native landraces 
have been selected over the generations to provide unique advantages not 
available in high-yield hybrid seeds.”). 
89 See id. at 21 (explaining how the southeastern region of Mexico’s cultural 
diversity mirrors the diversity of seed used by farmers in this region). 
90 See id. at 21–22 (“[I]ndigenous farmers concentrated in the southeastern 
section of the country tend to use the widest diversity of seeds while also 
suffering the highest levels of poverty and marginalization. . . .  The southeastern 
states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Chiapas tend to be dominated by traditional 
production methods.”).  
91 See id. at 26 (explaining that Mexican corn farmers are not compensated for 
their stewardship of genetic diversity). 
92 Id. at 4. 
93 See NADAL, supra note 82, at 5 (comparing corn production costs and yields 
in Mexico and the United States). 
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disproportionately accruing to the richest farmers and to 
agricultural exporters like Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland.94  
As Professors Alejandro Nadal and Timothy Wise point out, 
“[c]orn is one of the most heavily subsidized crops in the United 
States, with subsidies accounting for some 46% of farm income in 
the sector.”95  As a consequence of these subsidies, U.S. corn is 
exported at prices significantly below the cost of production, 
thereby undercutting corn farmers in Mexico.96  Second, the United 
States produces more corn per hectare than Mexico because it uses 
mechanized production methods in the wide-open fields of the 
U.S. Midwest.97  By contrast, eighty percent of Mexican corn is 
grown in mountainous, rain-fed areas that cannot be cultivated by 
mechanized means.98  Finally, U.S. corn is produced using large 
amounts of toxic agrochemicals and aquifer-depleting irrigation 
systems.99  Because the price of U.S. corn does not include the 
negative environmental impacts associated with these cultivation 
techniques, U.S. corn is under-priced relative to its true cost of 
production.100
 
94 See OXFAM, supra note 69, at 9–14 (discussing the magnitude of U.S. support 
for the corn sector and explaining that large grain traders such as Cargill and 
Archer Daniels Midland disproportionately benefit from this support); Henriques 
& Patel, supra note 52, at 24 (explaining that U.S. corn production is highly 
subsidized and that these subsidies depress world market corn prices); RAJ PATEL 
& SANAZ MEMARSADEGHI, FOOD FIRST, AGRICULTURAL RESTRUCTURING AND 
CONCENTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES? 6, 18–19 (Inst. for 
Food & Dev. Pol’y, Policy Brief No. 6, 2003), available at http://www.foodfirst.org 
/files/pdf/pb6.pdf (explaining that U.S. agricultural subsidies disproportionately 
benefit wealthy farmers and facilitate the acquisition of small operations by larger 
farmers and agribusiness). 
 
95 Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 15. 
96 See id. (describing the effects of low prices on Mexican corn farmers). 
97 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 25 (explaining that U.S. corn 
production is highly mechanized and occurs in the flatlands of the Midwest). 
98 See id. (“Mexico’s steep and mountainous terrain makes it difficult to 
introduce mechanized production.”). 
99 Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 7–12 (discussing the use of fertilizer, 
pesticides, and irrigation in U.S. corn farming). 
100 See id. at 26 (explaining that U.S. corn producers are not obligated to 
internalize the environmental costs of chemical-intensive cultivation methods). 
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4.2. Background to the Mexican Neoliberal Economic Reforms 
In order to evaluate the impact of NAFTA on the Mexican corn 
sector, it is important to place this agreement and the economic 
strategy of which it is a part in historical context.  From the 1930s 
until the beginning of the 1980s, Mexico followed an economic 
strategy of import substitution industrialization (“ISI”), whereby 
the Mexican state protected both agriculture and industry through 
tariffs and quotas on imports.101  The objective of ISI is to diversify 
and industrialize the economic base of agro-exporting developing 
countries by promoting the establishment of firms within the local 
economy that can produce the manufactured goods that the 
country imports.102  ISI enables developing countries to create new 
comparative advantages in dynamic economic sectors (such as 
manufacturing), to protect the new industry for a specified period 
through tariffs or quantitative restrictions on imports (infant 
industry protection), and, ultimately, to export the products of the 
new industry in lieu of traditional agricultural exports.103  For 
example, the Mexican chemical, automobile and metalworking 
industries were the main beneficiaries of import substitution in the 
1970s, and they began to export ten to fifteen percent of their 
production in the 1980s.104  While promoting ISI in the industrial 
sector, the Mexican government protected the livelihoods of small 
farmers (including corn producers) through price supports, 
subsidies for agricultural inputs (such as fertilizers and 
machinery), credit, and insurance.105
Mexico’s economic policies shifted in the 1980s as a 
consequence of the debt crisis of 1982 and of the structural 
adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank in the 
 
 
101 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 16 (describing Mexico’s economic 
development strategy and the use of ISI until 1982). 
102 See JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 271–76 (1997) (discussing the early stages of ISI). 
103 See id. at 276–80, 300–03 (explaining why ISI is needed and discussing  the 
later stages of ISI). 
104 ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF ‘THE REST’: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM 
LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 171 (2001). 
105 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 16 (“Mexico followed an import 
substitution strategy to industrialization (ISI), which protected national industry 
and agriculture . . . .  For agriculture this meant: price supports to producers of 
staple crops, subsidies for agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and machinery, 
credit and insurance.”). 
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context of debt restructuring.106  In order to obtain the foreign 
exchange earnings with which to service the foreign debt, Mexico 
abandoned ISI and adopted an export-oriented industrialization 
strategy, whereby subsidies were targeted to industries likely to 
become successful exporters.107  In the agricultural sector, Mexico 
subsidized large agro-exporters rather than small farms, thus 
fostering the growth of agribusiness.108  Other elements of the 
neoliberal economic model were also adopted, including opening 
the economy to foreign competition by reducing tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on imports, privatization of certain 
economic sectors, reduction of state involvement in the economy, 
and fiscal austerity.109  Mexico underscored its commitment to 
neoliberal economic reforms by becoming a party to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986, to NAFTA and the WTO 
in the 1990s, and to numerous other bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements.110
4.3. NAFTA, Comparative Advantage, and the Mexican Corn Sector 
 
One of NAFTA’S key objectives was to facilitate the free flow of 
goods and services in order to permit each NAFTA member to 
capitalize on its comparative advantage without the distortions 
produced by tariffs, subsidies, and non-tariff barriers.111
 
106 See id. at 14–16 (describing Mexico’s economic policies in the 1980s). 
  While 
NAFTA encouraged countries to reduce domestic agricultural 
subsidies, it imposed no binding subsidy reduction obligations 
107 See id. (examining Mexico’s shift from ISI to export-oriented 
development). 
108 See id. (explaining how Mexico’s free market economic reforms paved the 
way for agribusiness). 
109 See id. at 16 (“The liberalization of the market was part of a mix of policies 
that emphasized particular economic and monetary practices.  These range from 
fiscal discipline, price stability, balance of external accounts, decreases in state 
involvement, privatization of certain sectors of the economy, support for export- 
led production, and sustained growth.”). 
110 See id. (explaining how Mexico’s participation in NAFTA and other 
multilateral trade agreements demonstrates its underlying dedication to 
liberalization). 
111 See id. at 18 (“As with all of the free trade agreements, NAFTA aims, in 
principle, to capitalize on the comparative advantage of the three countries and 
establish trade regulations that allow for the free flow of goods in the region.”); 
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 102, U.S.-Can-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (specifying the objectives of NAFTA). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/1
GONZALEZ.DOC 3/18/2011  3:16 PM 
2011] MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS 747 
beyond those contained in GATT/WTO commitments.112  
However, NAFTA explicitly required the elimination of most 
agricultural tariffs by 2004.113  In light of the importance of corn 
production to the Mexican economy, Mexico negotiated a fifteen-
year transition period, during which existing import barriers 
would be transformed into a tariff-rate quota regime.114  Under the 
tariff-rate quota regime, a specific amount of U.S. corn would enter 
the Mexican market each year tariff-free (with the tariff-free 
amount expanding at the rate of three percent per year), while the 
remainder would be charged the applicable tariff, which would be 
reduced from 206% in 1994 to zero by 2008.115  Mexico proposed to 
gradually replace price supports for its corn farmers with less 
trade-distorting forms of support (such as direct income support, 
credit, and infrastructure investments), and reassured corn 
producers that they would receive adjustment assistance during 
the fifteen-year transition period.116
In practice, the Mexican government phased out tariffs over a 
period of thirty months (January 1994 to August 1996) rather than 
fifteen years, and permitted U.S. corn to enter the Mexican market 
virtually tariff-free beginning in 1996, resulting in an exponential 
increase in U.S. corn exports to Mexico.
 
117
 
112 See NAFTA, supra note 111, art. 704 (“[W]here a Party supports its 
agricultural producers, that Party should endeavor to work toward support 
measures that: a) have minimal or no trade distorting or production effects; or b) 
are exempt from any applicable domestic support reduction commitments that 
may be negotiated under the GATT.”). 
  By the year 2000, 
113 See id. art. 302(2) (“[E]ach Party shall progressively eliminate its customs 
duties on originating goods in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 302.2.”). 
114 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 18 (discussing how tariff rate 
quotas (“TRQ”) were applied to “sensitive” products, such as corn). 
115 Id. at 33; see JUAN RIVERA ET AL., NAFTA AND THE CAMPESINOS: THE IMPACT 
OF NAFTA ON SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS IN MEXICO AND THE 
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 91 (2009) (explaining the tariff-rate quota regime for U.S. 
corn imports); Nadal, supra note 81, at 146 (describing the fifteen-year transition 
period in which Mexico had to align their corn prices with international prices). 
116 See Nadal, supra note 81, at 146–47 (discussing the Mexican government’s 
official pronouncements during the NAFTA negotiations). 
117 See id. at 149 (“Mexico’s planned 15-year transition period for the 
corn/agricultural sector was compressed to roughly 30 months.”); Henriques & 
Patel, supra note 52, at 32; Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 5–6.  Mexican officials 
justified the decision to allow U.S. corn to enter the Mexican market virtually free 
of tariffs beginning in 1996 as a means of controlling corn prices and thereby 
keeping inflation under control.  However, the revenues foregone by the Mexican 
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Mexico had become the second largest export market for U.S. corn 
after Japan.118  By 2006–2008, U.S. corn exports to Mexico had 
quadrupled relative to pre-NAFTA levels.119  Because U.S. corn 
prices are significantly lower than Mexican prices, the elimination 
of tariff barriers on U.S. imports caused real corn prices in Mexico 
to plummet.120  This catastrophic drop in corn prices coincided 
with the Mexican government’s almost complete elimination of 
subsidies and price supports for the agricultural sector.121  The 
Mexican government abolished its program of subsidized credit, 
dismantled the government agency responsible for providing price 
support, and reduced its investment in technological 
improvements, such as irrigation.122  The Mexican government 
restructured its assistance to the agricultural sector to focus on 
modern, export-oriented farms rather than small producers.123
Mexican government officials were concerned that Mexican 
subsidies to corn farmers depleted the country’s fiscal reserves and 
prevented the country from realizing its comparative advantage in 
   
 
government as a result of the failure to implement the TRQ system have been 
estimated at two billion dollars.  Mexican officials claimed that implementing the 
TRQ system would have raised tortilla prices and generated pressure to increase 
consumer subsidies.  Thus, they argued, the tariff losses cancelled out the losses 
that would have been incurred through higher consumer subsidies.  
Unfortunately, subsequent events do not support the Mexican officials’ 
contention.  The domination of the tortilla market by two producers resulted in 
increased tortilla prices even as corn prices plummeted in the aftermath of 
NAFTA.  See NADAL, supra note 82, at 26–27, 39. 
118 Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 7. 
119 See Timothy A. Wise, Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA: Estimating the 
Costs of U.S. Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers 4 (Global Dev. & Envt. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 09–08, 2009), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp 
/09-08AgricDumping.pdf (explaining that U.S. corn exports to Mexico rose 413% 
between 1990–1992 and 2006–2008). 
120 See id. at 19 (“[W]ith the surge in [American] imports there was a 66% 
drop in real producer prices from the early 1990s to 2005 . . . .”). 
121 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 17–19 (explaining the Mexican 
government’s dramatic reduction of subsidies, credit, irrigation and other forms 
of assistance to small farmers in the aftermath of NAFTA); NADAL, supra note 82, 
at 5, 28–31 (describing the declining state support for agriculture that 
accompanied the post-NAFTA drop in corn prices); James C. McKinley Jr., Where 
Poverty Drove Zapatistas, the Living Is No Easier, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A12 
(“[G]overnment crop subsidies and supports have disappeared, erasing any gain 
from new welfare programs.”). 
122 Nadal &Wise, supra note 84, at 17–18. 
123 See id. at 18 (discussing government efforts to promote modern, export-
oriented corn production while reducing government support to small farmers). 
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other crops and in non-agricultural sectors of the economy.124  
Indeed, Mexico’s NAFTA negotiators hoped that two-thirds of 
Mexican corn farmers would shift from corn production to these 
other crops and sectors.125  Mexico agreed to open its markets to 
corn imports from the United States in exchange for greater access 
to U.S. and Canadian markets for labor-intensive crops (such as 
vegetables, nuts, fruits, and coffee) in which Mexico enjoyed a 
comparative advantage due to lower labor costs.126
4.4. Impact of Trade Liberalization in the Mexican Corn Sector 
   
Contrary to the expectations of Mexico’s NAFTA negotiators, 
corn production in Mexico remained stable despite the drastic 
decline in corn prices, and even experienced a slight increase.127  
There are several reasons for this paradox.  First, lacking 
governmental financial assistance (subsidies, credit, and 
technology) to switch to other crops, many farmers had no 
alternative but to increase corn production in order to stabilize 
income levels.128  Farmers boosted production by increasing 
pesticide and fertilizer use or by expanding the land under 
cultivation.129  Second, farmers’ decision to continue producing 
corn rather than switching to other crops (such as fruits and 
vegetables) was based on many additional variables, including 
market prices for these crops (which declined as a consequence of 
trade liberalization), stringent product quality standards in U.S. 
and Canadian markets, availability of suitable land and inputs, and 
the cost of processing, packaging, and transportation.130
 
124 Nadal, supra note 81, at 145–46. 
  Finally, 
subsistence farmers may have been reluctant to abandon corn 
production because corn is a dietary staple strongly associated 
125 Id. at 146. 
126 Id. 
127 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 27 (“In theory, producers should . . 
. cease to grow corn because it is no longer profitable.  But . . . production has 
remained stable, even increasing slightly after NAFTA.”). 
128 Id. at 28. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. (summarizing the factors that have an impact on farmers’ decision-
making); Nadal, supra note 81, at 156 (listing factors influencing corn producers’ 
decisions). 
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with Mexican culture and with the maintenance of traditional and 
indigenous rural lifeways.131
It is important to recognize the heterogeneity of Mexican 
farmers when evaluating the socioeconomic and environmental 
effects of trade liberalization in the Mexican corn sector.  In 
general, the literature on the Mexican corn sector recognizes three 
distinct groups of farmers:  (1) large, export-oriented mechanized 
agricultural producers; (2) intermediate farmers who produce for 
local and regional markets but also for household consumption; 
and, (3) small subsistence farmers who consume most of what they 
produce but sell some portion of their output in order to cover 
basic household expenses, such as education and healthcare.
 
132
Large, export-oriented farmers (primarily in the arid northern 
states of Sonora and Sinaloa) responded to the drop in corn prices 
by expanding corn production through greater use of pesticides, 
fertilizers, and irrigation water (often at unsustainable levels).
   
133  
Even though these farmers had the financial and technical 
wherewithal to switch to other crops, they failed to do so because 
the price of other crops was often lower than the price of corn.134  
Moreover, some analysts suggest that Mexico “has probably 
already maximized its penetration of the North American market” 
for horticultural crops, such as fruits and vegetables.135
 
131 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 28 (discussing the use of corn in 
“cultural rituals, ceremonies and religious services”); Nadal, supra note 81, at 156 
(noting that social and cultural preferences influence farmers’ economic 
decisions). 
  The 
ecological consequences of increased corn production included 
depletion of aquifers, salinization, and accumulation of chemical 
132 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 29–30 (describing three distinct 
profiles of corn producers and the impact trade liberalization had on them); 
NADAL, supra note 82, at 6–9 (providing an overview of the environmental and 
social consequences of NAFTA-led liberalization on competitive, intermediate, 
and subsistence corn producers). 
133 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 16 (listing the consequences of the 
increase in industrial agricultural production, including “high chemical use, with 
its accompanying environmental impacts [and] unsustainable water use for 
heavily irrigated farms”). 
134 See NADAL, supra note 82, at 6 (“As corn prices dropped, so did most of the 
prices for possible substitute crops.  Except for beans, cotton and soybean, other 
crops such as barley, rice, sorghum and wheat, maintained lower prices than corn, 
so that corn remained relatively more profitable.”). 
135 Id. at 7. 
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residues in soil, pollution of lakes and rivers, and increased human 
exposure to toxic agrochemicals.136
Intermediate farmers generally maintained more or less stable 
corn output, but experienced lost profits due to the drop in corn 
prices.
   
137  The economic stress occasioned by lower corn prices and 
the elimination of government subsidies caused many intermediate 
farmers to reduce their use of hired laborers.138  This, in turn, 
produced job loss among poorer subsistence farmers struggling to 
supplement their income with wage labor, and increased the 
pressure to migrate.139  The declining use of hired labor may have 
also impeded the ability of intermediate farmers to maintain the 
practices and structures that prevent soil erosion, such as terracing, 
hedging, ground cover crops, mulching, and minimum tillage.140
Finally, small subsistence farmers suffered extreme economic 
hardship as a consequence of declining corn prices and the 
elimination of government subsidies.
   
141  The sudden drop in corn 
prices deprived these farmers of the cash income necessary to 
obtain basic necessities for themselves and for their families, such 
as medical care, school supplies, and foods not produced on the 
farm.142  Ironically, the decline in corn prices was not accompanied 
by a decrease in the price of tortillas, a dietary staple.  On the 
contrary, tortilla prices increased three-fold in real terms between 
1994 and 1999 as a consequence of the oligopolistic domination of 
the corn flour industry by two Mexican corporations.143
 
136 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 16.  See generally NADAL, supra note 82, 
at 6–9 (discussing the negative environmental consequences resulting from the 
different farming practices of distinct types of producers). 
  Because it 
137 See NADAL, supra note 82, at 7 (“For the time being, intermediate 
producers have remained strong market participants and continue to engage in 
corn production.”). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See Nadal, supra note 81, at 156–57 (discussing the impact of plummeting 
corn prices on subsistence farmers). 
142 See OXFAM, supra note 69, at 6–8 (highlighting the plight of Mexican 
subsistence farmers). 
143 See id. at 18. 
The most stark example of the gap between the winners and the losers is 
the tortilla and flour sector, and its two main companies Maseca and 
Minsa.  These two companies . . . command a dominant position in the 
tortilla and flour processing industries, as a result of their political 
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became cheaper to grow corn rather than to purchase tortillas and 
other corn products on the market, many subsistence farmers 
increased corn production by bringing marginal lands under 
cultivation.144  The environmental consequences included “soil 
erosion, deforestation, and encroachment on biosphere reserves 
and other protected areas across Mexico.”145
The poverty and desperation produced by the collapse of 
Mexican corn prices caused many subsistence farmers to migrate to 
northern Mexico or to the United States in order to earn the cash 
necessary to support their families.
 
146  Indeed, from 1990 to 2000, 
the highest levels of out-migration in Mexico occurred in the 
regions with the highest levels of cultural diversity and corn agro-
biodiversity.147  This exodus of able-bodied male workers is 
fracturing families, leaving fields unplanted, and forcing women 
and children to work the land and to seek off-farm employment in 
order to supplement the family’s income.148
 
connections with the governments that have managed the liberalization 
of the sector. 
  Unfortunately, many 
of these rural migrants have been unable to find employment in 
Mexico’s urban areas because trade liberalization under NAFTA 
failed to create sufficient manufacturing jobs to keep pace with the 
Id.; NADAL, supra note 82, at 39 (finding that the tortilla “market is not competitive 
and the producers therefore have considerable power to set profit-maximizing 
prices.”). 
144 See NADAL, supra note 82, at 8 (describing how subsistence corn producers 
often farm under “difficult conditions of inferior soil, sloping terrain, irregular 
rainfall, and small landholdings”). 
145 Nadal, supra note 81, at 157. 
146 See id.; Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 36–37 (discussing migration’s 
adverse impact on rural farming communities); McKinley, supra note 121, at A12 
(noting that growing corn has become such a money-losing venture that farmers 
grow only enough for subsistence and let their other fields lie fallow); Nadal & 
Wise, supra note 84, at 25 (discussing how internal migration often precedes  
migration to the United States). 
147 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 25 tbl.3 (depicting the relationship 
between corn crop diversity, poverty, and migration).  Because the cost of 
migrating to the United States is high, poor farmers typically migrate to other 
regions of Mexico (such as the horticultural fields in northern Mexico) in order to 
earn the money necessary to migrate to the United States.  Id. 
148 See Bill Lambrecht, Mexican Farmers Forced from Fields by Low Prices, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 2005, at 14 (discussing how the exodus of men 
forces women and children to plant and tend the corn fields); OXFAM, supra note 
69, at 7–8 (noting that when women are forced to engage in wage labor they often 
lack the time to grind corn flour for tortillas, which forces them to rely on low-
quality commercial flour). 
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rural exodus.149  At least 500,000 Mexican workers migrate to the 
United States every year, many of them from Mexico’s 
impoverished rural areas.150  Indeed, approximately two-thirds of 
the estimated twelve million undocumented workers in the United 
States came after 1995 and many are regarded as casualties of 
NAFTA.151  Recognizing the relationship between U.S. agricultural 
trade policy and immigration, a New York Times editorial 
acknowledged that “ending subsidies for agribusiness would be 
far more effective than beefing up the border patrol.”152
Migration also has important cultural, environmental, and 
economic consequences in Mexico and poses risks to global food 
security.  Mexico’s impoverished, indigenous peasants are the 
custodians of Mexico’s genetically diverse varieties of corn.  This 
genetic diversity protects farmers from catastrophic crop loss in the 
event of environmental disturbances and is also vital to global food 
security.  The out-migration of farmers with traditional knowledge 
or experience may disrupt the transfer of this knowledge to future 
generations, leading to the replacement of traditional corn varieties 
with other crops or with commercial high-yield corn varieties, or, 
alternatively, to the abandonment of farming altogether.
  
153
 
149 See AUDLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 16–17, 20 (discussing how 
manufacturing employment under NAFTA has not improved commensurate with 
the increase in manufacturing output); KEVIN P. GALLAGHER & LYUBA ZARSKY, 
GLOBAL DEV. & ENV. INST., SUSTAINABLE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT?  THE 
PERFORMANCE OF MEXICO’S FDI-LED INTEGRATION STRATEGY 44–47 (Feb. 2004), 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/pubs/rp/mexicofdireport11-03.pdf (arguing that 
insufficient new manufacturing jobs have been created to keep pace with new 
entrants into the workforce and the jobs that have been created are of low quality). 
  In 
short, the migration of Mexican farmers threatens Mexico’s genetic 
150 See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 4 (2006), 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf; Julia Preston, Rules Collide with 
Reality in the Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2006, at A11; see also AUDLEY 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 51 (discussing the post-NAFTA acceleration of rural 
migration and explaining that an increasing proportion of rural migrants made 
their way to the United States). 
151 Marla Dickerson, NAFTA Has Had Its Trade-Offs for the U.S., L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.articles/latimes.com/2008/mar/03/business/fi-
nafta3. 
152 Tina Rosenberg, Why Mexico’s Small Corn Farmers Go Hungry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2003, at A22. 
153 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 20–21, 25 (pointing out the risks to corn 
agrobiodiversity posed by the out-migration of farmers who practice traditional 
cultivation techniques and by market pressure to cultivate commercial hybrid 
seeds or other crops).  
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diversity as well as the survival of Mexico’s indigenous 
population. 
The displacement of Mexican corn farmers as a result of the 
influx of highly subsidized U.S. corn has produced enormous 
social unrest in Mexico, including protests, hunger strikes, and 
civil disobedience.154  In January 2003, approximately one hundred 
thousand farmers converged on Mexico City to demand that the 
Mexican government renegotiate the agricultural chapter of 
NAFTA, provide emergency assistance to those harmed by trade 
liberalization, implement long-term agricultural development 
programs, invest in rural infrastructure and communities, and 
recognize the rights of indigenous peoples.155  While the farmers 
were unable to secure a commitment to renegotiate NAFTA from 
the pro-free trade administration of Mexican president Vicente 
Fox, they did secure new funds for rural development and an 
agreement to assess NAFTA’s impact on small farmers and to take 
action to defend and promote the agricultural sector.156  
Renegotiation of the agricultural chapter of NAFTA emerged as an 
important issue in the 2006 presidential election, with opposition 
candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador pledging to violate 
Mexico’s NAFTA commitment to eliminate tariffs on all 
agricultural products by 2008 and calling for a new accord to 
promote Mexico’s economic development.157
 
154 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 38 (noting that this phenomenon 
“reached its zenith most recently with the ‘El Campo no Aguanta Mas’ movement 
- literally the countryside can’t take it any more.”). 
  Opinion polls 
155 See id.; OXFAM, supra note 69, at 23 (explaining that the march was the 
culmination of the aforementioned ‘El Campo no Aguanta Mas’ movement); 
Timothy A. Wise, Fields of Free Trade, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 14 
(noting that Mexico’s small farmers collectively demanded that their government 
renegotiate NAFTA’s agricultural provisions). 
156 See Wise, supra note 155, at 14 (describing the improvements the farmers 
were able to secure from the government). 
157 See Jack Epstein, Lopez Obrador Victory Would Alter Relations with 
States/Candidate Says He’d Focus on the Poor, Revise NAFTA, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 1, 
2006, http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-07-01/news/17302349_1_trade-pact-
president-vicente-fox-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador (noting López Obrador’s 
objections to NAFTA and his pledge to continue corn and bean tariffs); Tim 
Padgett, Bush in Mexico: Whatever Happened to NAFTA?, TIME, Mar. 30, 2006 
(discussing López Obrador’s plan to attempt to renegotiate NAFTA); Mark 
Stevenson, Mexico Hopeful Takes Hard Line vs. NAFTA, ASSOC. PRESS, June 18, 2006, 
available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0618-05.htm (relating 
López Obrador’s promise to impose tariffs on U.S. corn and bean imports in 
violation of NAFTA). 
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conducted in 2007 revealed that Mexicans disapproved of NAFTA 
by a ratio of two to one.158  When tariffs on U.S. agricultural 
products were largely eliminated in 2008 pursuant to NAFTA, 
50,000 to 100,000 Mexican protestors marked the event by 
paralyzing traffic in Mexico City to demand renegotiation of the 
Agreement.159
Finally, some Mexican farmers turned to marijuana as a highly 
profitable crop to replace corn.
  
160  The amount of marijuana seized 
each year on the border has doubled since NAFTA took effect in 
1994 and U.S. authorities have discovered more than seventy-five 
tunnels funneling drugs from Mexico to the United States between 
2006 and 2010 alone.161  Drug-related violence along the border has 
also skyrocketed and the drug cartels are increasingly diversifying 
their operations and expanding their revenues by participating in 
the lucrative migrant-smuggling business.162
4.5. Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalization 
  While these 
correlations do not necessarily establish causation, they do 
highlight the importance of integrating drug policy, immigration 
policy, and trade policy. 
In order to draw lessons from the Mexican experience with 
agricultural trade liberalization, it is important to assess who wins 
and who loses as a consequence of this economic reform.  In the 
United States, the main beneficiaries of trade liberalization in the 
corn sector are large agricultural enterprises that receive generous 
agricultural subsidies as well as corn exporters, such as Cargill and 
Archer Daniels Midland, that undercut Mexican producers by 
selling corn on world markets at artificially depressed prices.163
 
158 See Dickerson, supra note 151. 
  
159 See id.; James McKinley Jr., Mexican Farmers Protest End of Corn-Import 
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at A12 (relating how farmers at the protest feared 
that a flood of cheap imported American corn would wipe them out).  
160 See Lambrecht, supra note 148 (discussing the survival strategies of 
Mexican corn farmers in the aftermath of NAFTA). 
161 See id.; Rebecca Cathcart, Second Rail-Equipped Drug Tunnel Found at 
Mexican Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2010, at A12; Jennifer Medina, Drugs Seized in 
Tunnel Near Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A18.  
162 See Peter Schrag, Blowback at the Border, THE NATION, May 4, 2009, at 23 
(noting the expansion of drug cartels’ activity into migrant smuggling). 
163 See OXFAM, supra note 69, at 3, 18 (arguing that large American farmers, 
and agricultural conglomerates like ADM, Cargill, and their Mexican partners, 
receive the lion’s share of the benefits of corn exports to Mexico).  In the United 
States, seventy-two percent of the $43.2 billion disbursed by the federal 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
GONZALEZ.DOC 3/18/2011  3:16 PM 
756 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:3 
Between 1997 and 2005, for example, U.S. agro-exporters dumped 
corn on Mexican markets at an average of nineteen percent below 
the cost of production.164  These exporters also benefit from the 
U.S. government’s provision of export credits to Mexican 
importers of U.S. corn in order to increase U.S. market share and 
help U.S. companies compete against foreign producers.165  In 
Mexico, the primary beneficiaries are the importers of U.S. corn, 
particularly large livestock enterprises (who use the corn for 
animal feed) and processors of soft drinks (who use corn syrup).166  
The two Mexican firms that dominate tortilla production also 
benefit from depressed corn prices because their market power has 
enabled them to raise tortilla prices rather than pass on the lower 
corn prices to consumers.167  Indeed, public outcry over soaring 
tortilla prices and over the hoarding of corn flour by the giant 
tortilla companies in order to drive prices even higher prompted 
Mexican President Felipe Calderón to impose price controls on 
tortillas in early 2007.168
The primary losers from trade liberalization are small farmers 
and consumers in Mexico, particularly traditional and indigenous 
 
 
government from 1995 to 2009 to subsidize corn production was paid to the top 
ten percent of corn subsidy recipients.  Farm Subsidy Database, ENVTL WORKING 
GRP., available at http://www.ewg.org/farm/progdetail.php?fips=00000 
&progcode=corn&page=conc.  Since payments are linked to land area and past 
output, larger, wealthier farmers receive the greatest subsidies—even though 
seventy-five percent of all corn farmers in the United States are small farmers.  See 
OXFAM, supra note 69, at 13.  In Mexico, farm subsidies and credit have likewise 
been channeled to large-scale agricultural enterprises, leading many small farmers 
to undertake off-farm employment, rent their land to commercial growers, or 
simply sell their lands in order to survive.  See AUDLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 28–
80; OXFAM, supra note 69, at 7–8.  Like small farmers in Mexico, some small 
farmers in the United States are taking off-farm jobs, renting out their land, or 
abandoning agricultural production because the income received from selling 
their agricultural output is insufficient to cover the cost of production.  See OXFAM, 
supra note 69, at 10, 13. 
164 See Wise, supra note 119, at 21. 
165 See OXFAM, supra note 69, at 3, 12–13 (discussing how export credits 
benefit major U.S. corn producers). 
166 See id. at 18 (noting that the primary Mexican beneficiaries of U.S. 
agricultural policy are major corn importers). 
167 See id.  In Mexico City, for example, tortilla prices rose 279% between 1994 
and 2004 even though corn prices plummeted as a consequence of U.S. agro-
export dumping.  See Patel & Henriques, supra note 81, at 4. 
168 See James C. McKinley Jr., Cost of Corn Soars, Forcing Mexico to Set Price 
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A12 (discussing how Calderón was forced to 
abandon his free-trade principles because of public outrage over corn prices). 
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farmers whose livelihoods have been destroyed by the elimination 
of tariffs and by U.S. agricultural subsidies.  However, human 
health and the environment in both the United States and Mexico 
have suffered under this arrangement in ways that are not 
immediately obvious due to the fact that social and environmental 
externalities (positive and negative) are not reflected in corn prices. 
Corn production in the United States is more chemical-
intensive than the production of other commodities (such as wheat 
or soybeans) and it is increasingly expanding into dry areas where 
irrigation is necessary.169  As corn production expands to meet 
Mexican demand, U.S. surface and groundwater supplies are 
increasingly contaminated by agricultural runoff.170  The 
contamination of surface waters by nitrogen-containing fertilizers 
promotes algae blooms that reduce dissolved oxygen in the water, 
thereby killing fish and other wildlife.171  The great quantities of 
nitrogen carried from the nation’s agricultural heartland by the 
Mississippi River have already produced a “dead zone” in the Gulf 
of Mexico, where marine life cannot survive.172  Likewise, atrazine, 
the most common herbicide used on corn, disrupts the endocrine 
system and is known to cause cancer in rats.173  Exposure to 
atrazine poses serious risks for farm workers (many of whom are 
Mexican immigrants), consumers of corn products, and people 
who use groundwater downstream from fields where corn is 
cultivated.174  Chlorpyrifos, the most common insecticide used in 
corn production, is a neurotoxin that is particularly dangerous to 
children who are exposed to it at high levels.175
 
169 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 9–11 (concluding that corn is more 
chemically intensive than other crops). 
  Finally, the 
expansion of corn cultivation into Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, and 
Colorado to meet growing Mexican demand has necessitated the 
pumping of additional groundwater for irrigation, resulting in 
170 See id. at 7–12 (assessing the environmental impact in the United States of 
increased corn production in the aftermath of NAFTA). 
171 See id. at 8 (describing the agrochemical contamination of surface and 
groundwater supplies in the United States as a consequence of corn cultivation). 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
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unsustainable rates of withdrawal from the Ogallala Aquifer and 
conflicts over water rights.176
In Mexico, the most significant social externality resulting from 
the drop in corn prices is growing rural poverty, which has 
increased rural-to-urban migration and threatens the integrity of 
indigenous and local farming communities.
   
177  The most significant 
environmental externality is the threat to agrobiodiversity posed 
by the out-migration of the farmers who cultivate Mexico’s diverse 
corn varieties.178
The market price for U.S. corn understates the true social cost 
of production because it neglects to internalize the human health 
and environmental costs discussed above.  Conversely, the market 
price for Mexican corn fails to take into account the social and 
environmental benefits of traditional corn cultivation, including 
the well-being of indigenous farming communities and the 
importance for these communities and for the world’s food supply 
of conserving Mexico’s diverse corn varieties. 
 
As a consequence of trade liberalization, market failures in the 
United States interface with market failures in Mexico to create a 
price structure that misidentifies the United States as the most 
efficient corn producer, thereby increasing harm to human health 
and the environment in the United States, undermining the 
sustainable livelihoods of indigenous communities in Mexico, and 
jeopardizing Mexico’s genetic diversity.179  Economist James Boyce 
has referred to this phenomenon as the “globalization of market 
failure.”180
 
176 See id. at 11 (“Well-publicized problems concerning irrigation include the 
unsustainable rate of withdrawals from the Ogallala Aquifer, and conflicts over 
the scarce and overused water from western rivers.”). 
 
177 See id. at 24–25 (pointing out that two-fifths of the Mexican rural districts 
with the highest levels of poverty and corn genetic diversity have experienced 
out-migration). 
178 See id. at 20–21 (“[F]igures on production or planted area or even 
migration may mask trends that are leading to the gradual loss of traditional 
knowledge in the process of seed selection, which is the basis for the ongoing 
evolution and stewardship of maize genetic diversity.”).  
179 See id. at 26–27 (“Market failures in one area—negative externalities in the 
U.S.—interact with market failures in another—positive externalities in Mexico—
to create a net environmental impact that is greater than the sum of its parts.”). 
180 JAMES K. BOYCE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ENVIRONMENT 88–103 
(2002). 
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5. LESSONS FROM THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS 
The grim saga of the Mexican corn sector illustrates why 
industrialized country agricultural subsidies have become one of 
the most contentious issues in the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations.  Poor farmers in developing countries cannot 
compete with highly subsidized agricultural producers in the 
United States and the European Union.  The economic dislocations 
in the Mexican countryside are being replicated all over the world, 
as developing countries reduce agricultural tariffs and eliminate 
subsidies pursuant to IMF and World Bank mandated structural 
adjustment programs, or pursuant to bilateral and multilateral free 
trade agreements.181  Rather than being governed by comparative 
advantage, winners and losers in agricultural trade are determined 
on the basis of “comparative access to subsidies—an area in which 
food producers in the industrialized world [enjoy] an unrivalled 
advantage over those in developing countries.”182
Dismantling industrialized country agricultural subsidies and 
import barriers is an essential first step toward mitigating the 
inequities in global agricultural trade that exacerbate poverty and 
accelerate rural-to-urban migration in developing countries. 
However, it is important to recognize that formal equality in the 
rules governing international trade is not sufficient to produce 
substantive equality among vastly unequal trading partners.  
Contrary to the views expressed in the World Bank’s 2004 report 
on global agricultural trade, it is dangerous to advise developing 
countries to capitalize on their “comparative advantage” in 
agricultural production as a means of combating poverty and 
promoting economic development—even if industrialized country 
protectionism is eliminated.
 
183
 
181 See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., Synthesis of Country Case Studies, para. 18 
(FAO Symposium on Agriculture, Trade and Food Security, Paper No. 3, Sept. 
1999), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/meeting/x3065E.htm (citing the 
marginalization of small producers as a reason for the increase in unemployment 
and poverty); John Madeley, Trade and Hunger: An Overview of Case Studies on the 
Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Food Security, GLOBALA STUDIER, Oct. 2000, at 8, 15, 
34–35, 72, available at http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/645.pdf 
(explaining that agricultural trade liberalization has generally increased rural 
poverty and inequality and accelerated migration from rural areas). 
  The Mexican case study serves as a 
182 Kevin Watkins, Free Trade and Farm Fallacies: From the Uruguay Round to the 
World Food Summit, 26 ECOLOGIST 244, 245 (1996).  
183 See Aksoy & Beghin, supra note 75, at 3 (providing an overview of the 
World Bank report on global agricultural trade and developing countries). 
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useful vehicle for examining the limitations in the theory of 
comparative advantage that counsel against an agro-export led 
development strategy.  These limitations are examined in detail 
below. 
5.1. The Importance of State Intervention to Promote Economic 
Diversification 
Contrary to the agro-export specialization advocated by the 
World Bank based on the theory of comparative advantage, it is 
well-established that economic diversification and industrialization 
are essential for economic prosperity.184  As the United Nations 
Development Programme points out:  “Success in global markets 
depends increasingly on the development of industrial capabilities.  
In a knowledge-based global economy cheap labour and exports of 
primary commodities or simple assembled goods are insufficient to 
support rising living standards.”185
Specialization in the export of primary commodities is 
disastrous for developing countries due to the long-term decline in 
agricultural commodity prices relative to the price of 
manufactured goods—a phenomenon first described over 50 years 
ago by economists Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, confirmed by 
subsequent empirical studies, and predicted to continue despite 
the post-2008 boom in agricultural commodity prices.
 
186
 
184 See UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, supra note 63, at 120–21 
(noting that openness to trade has its costs); Erik S. Reinert, Increasing Poverty in a 
Globalized World: Marshall Plans and Morgenthau Plans as Mechanisms of Polarization 
of World Incomes, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 453, 470 (Ha-Joon 
Chang ed., 2003) (explaining that “[n]o nation has ever taken the step from being 
poor to being wealthy by exporting raw material in the absence of a domestic 
manufacturing sector”); Howard Stein, Rethinking African Development, in 
RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra, 153, 155–56, 169 (detailing the ill 
effects of IMF and World Bank policies that relegated African countries to primary 
product exports and arguing that economic diversification and industrialization 
are necessary to foster economic development). 
  The most 
185 UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, supra note 63, at 120–21. 
186 See U.N. Food & Agric. Org., The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 
10, 12–13 (2004) (arguing that “[p]rices of agricultural commodities can be 
expected to decline relative to industrial products as technological advances 
reduce costs . . . . “); CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 102, at 87 box3.5, 177–80 
(explaining the reasoning behind the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis).  Despite the 
2007–2008 boom in agricultural commodity prices—due, in part, to growing 
demand for biofuels and speculative investment in commodity markets fueled by 
the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble—analysts predict that prices will continue 
to decline over the long term.  See Wise, supra note 76, at 856 (arguing that “the 
current commodity boom . . . is unlikely to fundamentally alter the structure of 
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vulnerable countries in the global economy are those that 
specialize in the export of one or two agricultural commodities and 
rely on the revenues generated by these exports for the purchase of 
food, energy, and other necessities.187  Poor harvests, volatility in 
agricultural commodity markets, and the declining terms of trade 
for agricultural products vis-à-vis manufactured goods can 
interfere with the ability of these countries to acquire food and 
other essential items on international markets and to obtain the 
foreign exchange earnings necessary for productive investment.188
Furthermore, notwithstanding the neoliberal policy 
prescriptions of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, successful 
industrialization typically requires aggressive market intervention 
by the state.  Nearly all industrialized countries (including 
   
 
global agriculture and the long-term trends toward lower prices.”).  See generally 
U.N. DEP’T. OF ECON. AFFAIRS, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND 
ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/89/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. SO.11.G.2 
(1950) (suggesting that nations who specialize in exporting raw materials have 
little incentive to industrialize).  There are two principal reasons cited in the 
economics literature for the long-term decline in agricultural commodity prices.  
First, demand for manufactured goods increases with rising income, whereas 
demand for food does not.  Second, labor productivity is generally higher in 
countries that produce manufactured products.  See, e.g., Henry J. Bruton, A 
Reconsideration of Import Substitution, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 903, 905 (1998) 
(explaining the reasons for the long-term decline in primary commodity prices). 
187 Currently, approximately forty-three countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean rely on agro-export production to generate over 
half of foreign exchange earnings and depend on a single agricultural commodity 
for over twenty percent of their export revenues.  U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE 
STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 17 (2003), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/j0083e/j0083e00.pdf. 
188 See PETER ROBBINS, STOLEN FRUIT: THE TROPICAL COMMODITIES DISASTER 2–3, 
12–15 (2003) (discussing the devastating impact on small farmers and agriculture-
dependent developing nations of declining agricultural commodity prices); 
CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 102, at 86 (explaining that primary product 
specialization is not a viable development strategy); U.N. Food & Agric. Org., 
supra note 187, at 17 (noting that declines in agricultural commodity prices in 
export-dependent developing countries “have taken a toll on income, investment, 
employment, and growth”).  Regrettably, World Bank and IMF policies 
promoting specialization in agro-export production as a means of servicing the 
foreign debt have consigned much of sub-Saharan Africa to grinding poverty by 
limiting the ability of African countries to diversify their exports and move into 
more lucrative manufacturing sectors.  Furthermore, in African countries that 
possessed manufacturing capacity, World Bank and IMF-mandated elimination of 
protectionist barriers undermined these fledgling industries by prematurely 
opening them up to the full force of foreign competition.  See Stein, supra note 184, 
at 155–56, 169–70 (suggesting that the solution to Africa’s economic stagnation is 
to develop the region’s industrial capacity through private sector or join private-
state entrepreneurship). 
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Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United 
States) achieved economic prosperity through economic 
protectionism, including subsidies, tariffs, and state funding of 
industry.189  Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, state intervention in 
the market played a critical role in the rapid industrialization of 
several East Asian countries (including Taiwan and South 
Korea).190  South Korea, for example, directed and subsidized 
credit to certain key industries, required firms to increase the use 
of local inputs, imposed technology transfer requirements on 
foreign investors, disregarded intellectual property rights to 
encourage copying and reverse engineering, and only gradually 
opened its economy to foreign competition.191  Most recently, 
China became a major economic power in the course of a few 
decades through the use of tariffs, import quotas, technology 
transfer requirements, local content requirements, and other forms 
of state intervention to achieve long-term development goals.192  
What these countries have in common is their successful use of 
industrial policy—the identification and aggressive promotion of 
those economic sectors likely to increase overall economic well-
being.193
In sum, the economic specialization promoted by the theory of 
comparative advantage is fundamentally at odds with the 
  It is ironic that industrialized countries, having achieved 
economic prosperity through the use of protectionism, are now 
counseling developing countries to open up their markets to 
foreign competition and to capitalize on their comparative 
advantage in agricultural production. 
 
189 See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19–51, 59–66 (2002) (discussing the successful 
industrial, trade, and technology policies used by now-developed countries). 
190 See Ha-Joon Chang, The East Asian Development Experience, in RETHINKING 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 184, at 107, 114–17 (explaining the East 
Asian model of development). 
191 See Sanjaya Lall, Technology and Industrial Development in an Era of 
Globalization, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 184, at  277, 293–
94 (discussing the elements of South Korea’s successful economic development 
strategy). 
192 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, China in Latin America: Law, Economics, and 
Sustainable Development, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS, 10171, 10174–75 
(2010) (explaining that China achieved unprecedented economic prosperity 
through protectionist policies that contravened neoliberal economic orthodoxy). 
193 See ROBIN HAHNEL, THE ABCS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: A MODERN 
APPROACH 268–70 (2002) (discussing the industrial policy of several now-
developed nations). 
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economic diversification and industrialization necessary for 
successful economic development.  Furthermore, state intervention 
in the economy is necessary in order to create comparative 
advantage in those industries most likely to enhance long-term 
national economic welfare under current market conditions 
(dynamic comparative advantage).  The World Bank’s advocacy of 
agro-export production appears to be based on a static conception 
of comparative advantage that would relegate developing 
countries to economically disadvantageous patterns of primary 
product specialization imposed during the colonial era.194
These insights were not lost on Mexico.  Beginning in the 1930s, 
Mexico developed its manufacturing base through aggressive state 
intervention in the market in order to avoid the pitfalls of agro-
export specialization.  Only since the debt crisis of 1982 has Mexico 
embarked upon neoliberal economic reforms that curtailed public 
investment, slashed social programs for the poor (including poor 
farmers), privatized public enterprises, and allocated subsidies to 
large export-oriented enterprises (such as the large, mechanized 
farms in northern Mexico).
   
195
Notwithstanding Mexico’s diversified economic base and 
strength in certain technology sectors (such as automobiles and 
electronics), greater economic openness beginning in the 1980s and 
1990s has been associated with wage stagnation, increasing 
unemployment, and declining economic growth.
 
196  One of the 
reasons for this poor economic performance is weak industrial 
policy.197
 
194 See id. at 184 (explaining how Japan and South Korea created “new 
comparative advantages in high productivity industries rather than continue to 
specialize in industries where productivity growth was slow”). 
  Much of Mexico’s recent export growth has been based 
on the assembly and re-export of imported products by low-wage, 
low-skill workers in maquiladoras with limited local value added, 
no linkages to the rest of the economy (such as the stimulation of 
businesses that might supply parts and materials) and limited 
transfer of technology—akin to low-wage, low-skill garment 
195 See Henriques & Patel, supra note 52, at 16 (discussing Mexico’s 
abandonment of state-led economic development in favor of free market 
economic reforms).   
196 See UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, supra note 63, at 121–22 
(pointing out the pitfalls of market openness using Mexico and Vietnam as 
examples). 
197 See id. at 122 (citing weak industrial policy as one of the four main reasons 
for Mexico’s poor economic performance). 
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exporters like Bangladesh, Honduras, and Nicaragua.198  Indeed, 
since 1980, the maquiladora sector has been the centerpiece of the 
Mexican export-oriented economic model, comprising over half of 
Mexico’s total manufactured exports.199  This economic model has 
rendered Mexico vulnerable to low-wage competitors such as 
China,200 and has resulted in the loss of over one million 
manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2009.201  The weakness of 
Mexico’s manufacturing sector has limited the country’s ability to 
absorb rural migrants in the aftermath of the NAFTA-induced 
economic dislocations in the agricultural sector.202  In addition, 
with more than eighty-five percent of its exports destined for the 
United States, Mexico suffered greater losses than any other Latin 
American country as a consequence of the 2009 economic 
downturn in the United States in the wake of the financial crisis.203
In short, one of the lessons of the Mexican case study is that the 
rules governing international trade must enable developing 
countries to use tariffs, subsidies, and other protectionist measures 
to protect vulnerable populations (such as small farmers and 
indigenous communities) from unfair competition, to foster robust 
   
 
198 Id. at 118; AUDLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 16–17 (enumerating the dangers 
of relying on low-wage, low-skill export sectors that depend on imported inputs 
and fail to stimulate local businesses).  
199 See Raúl Delgado Wise, Migration and Imperialism: The Mexican Workforce in 
the Context of NAFTA, 33 LATIN AM. PERSP. 33, 34–35 (2006) (discussing the role of 
the maquiladora sector in Mexico’s economy). 
200 UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, supra note 63, at 122.  Mexico 
faces fierce competition from China in labor-intensive economic sectors such as 
garment manufacturing and electronics.  In 2003, Mexico was displaced by China 
as the second-largest exporter to the United States after Japan.  As the United 
States enters into additional free trade agreements with low-wage nations (such as 
the members of Central American Free Trade Agreement) Mexico’s comparative 
advantage in low-wage, low-skill labor may be further undermined.  AUDLEY ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 17. 
201 See Enrique Dussel Peters, Manufacturing Competitiveness: Toward a 
Regional Development Agenda, in THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: 
LESSONS FROM NAFTA 27, 29 (Bos. Univ., Frederick S. Pardee Ctr. for the Study of 
the Long Range Future, 2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2009 
/11/Pardee-Report-NAFTA.pdf. 
202 See AUDLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 16–17, 20 (pointing out that Mexico’s 
post-NAFTA growth in manufacturing exports was accompanied by stagnation in 
manufacturing employment); Gallagher & Zarsky, supra note 149, at 44–47 
(arguing that “the bumpy growth in the manufacturing sector . . . has exacerbated 
unemployment and underemployment in Mexico.”). 
203 See ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (discussing how the 2009 economic 
downturn in the United States had a significant negative impact on the Mexican 
economy). 
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industrial capabilities, and to promote job growth in dynamic 
economic sectors.  Countries that attempt to capitalize on their 
comparative advantage in agricultural production or low-wage, 
low-skill labor will inevitably lose out in increasingly competitive 
international markets.204
5.2. The Cost of Adjusting to the Economic Dislocations Caused by 
Trade Liberalization 
 
Some advocates of neoliberal economic reforms assume that 
countries can easily adjust to the economic dislocations caused by 
trade liberalization (such as the loss of jobs, firms, and even entire 
industries) because the overall benefits of trade liberalization will 
ultimately outweigh the costs.205  Mexico’s NAFTA negotiators 
expected that NAFTA-induced declines in corn prices would re-
allocate land, labor, and capital to productive activities (elsewhere 
in the agricultural sector or in other economic sectors) that would 
better utilize Mexico’s comparative advantage in low-wage 
labor.206  Indeed, according to the theory developed by economists 
Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin (hereinafter the “Heckscher-Ohlin 
hypothesis”), trade liberalization should increase demand for 
goods that use inputs in which a country has a comparative 
advantage.207  Mexico has a comparative advantage in unskilled 
labor.  Accordingly, trade liberalization should increase U.S. 
demand for Mexican labor-intensive goods, thereby generating 
employment for displaced Mexican farmers, placing upward 
pressure on wages and reducing migration.208
The benefits of trade liberalization predicted by the NAFTA 
negotiators and by the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis were not 
realized for several reasons.  First, the capacity of other agricultural 
 
 
204 See UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, supra note 63, at 119–23 
(suggesting that success in global markets requires developing industrial 
capabilities). 
205 See HA-JOON CHANG & ILENE GRABEL, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT: AN 
ALTERNATIVE POLICY ECONOMIC MANUAL 59-66 (2004) (explaining and critiquing 
the view that the benefits of trade liberalization outweigh the adjustment costs).  
206 See Nadal, supra note 81, at 146–47 (suggesting that faulty economic 
assumptions underlay Mexico’s agreement to include corn in NAFTA). 
207 See HAHNEL, supra note 193, at 188-90 (describing and critiquing the 
Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis). 
208 See Thomas, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing how trade liberalization 
between a capital-rich country such as the United States and a labor-rich country 
such as Mexico would play out under the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
GONZALEZ.DOC 3/18/2011  3:16 PM 
766 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:3 
sectors (such as fruit and vegetable production) to absorb 
displaced corn producers had been over-estimated.209  While 
exports of fruits and vegetables to the United States increased, 
these exports came from a small number of states with capital-
intensive, highly industrialized production systems that employed 
limited numbers of agricultural workers.210  Second, the Mexican 
manufacturing sector was unable to generate sufficient jobs to keep 
pace with the influx of rural migrants to Mexico’s urban areas due 
to weak industrial policy, limited linkages between manufacturing 
and other economic sectors, and growing competition from 
China.211  Finally, the benefits of trade liberalization in the 
developing world were eclipsed by the severe economic 
dislocations in the agricultural sector caused by the Green 
Revolution, structural adjustment, and policies undertaken 
pursuant to bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.212
Mexico’s neoliberal economic reforms can be regarded as the 
continuation and intensification of misguided efforts to 
“modernize” the agricultural sector at the expense of Mexico’s 
indigenous rural communities.  These efforts commenced at 
independence, were reversed by the Mexican Revolution, but 
resumed with full force under the auspices of the Green Revolution 
and the post-1982 neoliberal economic reforms.  The export-
oriented policies promoted by the World Bank and the IMF in the 
aftermath of the debt crisis exacerbated rural poverty and 
inequality by requiring debtor nations to simultaneously slash 
subsidies to poor farmers and open their markets to devastating 
competition from highly subsidized transnational agribusiness 
headquartered in the industrialized world.
  
213
 
209 See Nadal, supra note 81, at 155 (explaining that increased efficiency in the 
horticultural and fruit sectors led to increased outputs without generating 
additional agricultural jobs—contrary to Mexican government expectations). 
  The pauperization of 
210 See Timothy A. Wise, Reforming NAFTA’s Agricultural Provisions, in THE 
FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: LESSONS FROM NAFTA, supra note 201, 
at 35, 36 (“Exports came overwhelmingly from a small number of states with 
highly industrialized agriculture and relatively developed infrastructure.”). 
211 See Peters, supra note 201, at 28–30 (discussing the limited growth of the 
manufacturing sector in Mexico); ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 4, at 10–12 (concluding 
that NAFTA generated large increases in trade and foreign investment but created 
relatively few jobs). 
212 See HAHNEL, supra note 193, at 189 (arguing that the Green Revolution has 
made the “rural labor force redundant in third world agriculture.”).  
213 See Gonzalez, supra note 49, at 467 (arguing that “the lowering of tariff 
barriers and the elimination of non-tariff barriers in developing countries 
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rural communities and the depopulation of the countryside 
continued under NAFTA as over two million Mexican farmers 
abandoned agricultural production in response to the surge of 
cheap imported food from the United States.214  The exodus from 
rural areas in the Global South has been so great in recent decades 
that urban unemployment is increasing rather than declining and 
real wages continue to fall.215
Finally, the theory of comparative advantage underestimates 
the costs of adjustment to trade liberalization because it fails to 
take into account the devastating impact of rural-to-urban 
migration on the spiritual, material, and cultural well-being of 
indigenous communities.  Indigenous peoples possess a powerful 
cultural connection to their ancestral lands, and separation from 
these lands, resources, and lifeways can result in cultural 
disintegration.
 
216  Indigenous peoples who are forced to migrate to 
urban areas in search of wage labor often suffer extreme poverty as 
a consequence of discrimination, limited formal education, 
language barriers, and lack of marketable skills for the urban 
workforce.217  Indigenous migrants experience difficulty securing 
employment, finding culturally appropriate education and health 
care, and obtaining adequate housing.218  Migration to the United 
States poses its own challenges, including racial, ethnic, and 
language discrimination; lack of access to health care and 
government services; and the difficulty of maintaining collective 
identities and indigenous languages.219
 
increased rural poverty and depressed domestic food production by exposing 
developing country farmers to ruinous competition from industrialized country 
producers.”). 
  One of the lessons of the 
214 See Wise, supra note 210, at 35 (noting that this represents a twenty-five 
percent drop in the number of people engaged in agriculture). 
215 See HAHNEL, supra note 193, at 190 (discussing how the job-creating effects 
of trade liberalization in Mexico have been overwhelmed by the exodus of 
farmers from rural areas, leading to increased overall unemployment). 
216 See Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1645 (“Geographical location is essential to 
indigenous identity.”). 
217 See CARLOS YESCAS ANGELES TRUJANO, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, 
INDIGENOUS ROUTES: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING INDIGENOUS MIGRATION 
24, 45–46 (2008) (describing the set of challenges generally faced by indigenous 
migrants). 
218 See id. at 45–50. 
219 See Fox & Rivera-Salgado, supra note 6, at 12–13, 22–24 (describing the 
unique challenges experienced by indigenous Mexican migrants in the United 
States and their efforts to overcome these difficulties by creating community 
institutions and providing social services in indigenous languages). 
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Mexican case study is the danger of relying on de-contextualized 
economic theories (such as the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis) that 
neglect to consider real world economic and political dynamics.220
5.3. The Conflict between Agro-Export Specialization and Agro-
Biodiversity 
 
The theory of comparative advantage promotes economic 
specialization in goods that a country produces relatively more 
efficiently.  For countries well-suited to agricultural production, 
the theory of comparative advantage would counsel specialization 
in several primary agricultural commodities and importation of 
manufactured goods. 
One of the lessons of the Mexican case study is that extending 
the principle of specialization from industry to agriculture is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the agrobiodiversity necessary to 
protect the integrity of the world’s food supply.  Cultivating 
different varieties of corn designed to resist different 
environmental conditions enables local farmers to diversify their 
risk in the event of crop failure.  This genetic diversity is also 
essential to the world’s plant breeders as they seek to develop new 
varieties to address the food security challenges of the 21st century, 
including climate change. 
The lessons of the Mexican case study are broadly applicable to 
other crops.  One of the great risks posed to small farmers in 
developing countries and to the resilience of the world’s food 
supply is the pressure to abandon traditional, biodiverse 
cultivation techniques in favor of uniform seeds, chemical 
fertilizers, and synthetic pesticides.221  Indeed, the U.N. Food and 
Agriculture Organization reports that seventy-five percent of the 
world’s food crop diversity was lost in the 20th century.222
 
220 See HAHNEL, supra note 193, at 189 (discussing the inherent limitations of 
economic theories). 
  
Although thousands of food crops have been cultivated since the 
beginning of agriculture, four crops (corn, wheat, potato, and rice) 
currently supply sixty percent of the world’s dietary energy from 
221 See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 87, at 56–81 (tracing the history of 
industrial agriculture from the Green Revolution through the end of the 
twenthieth century and examining the resulting loss of crop genetic diversity).  
222 Women: Users, Preservers, and Managers of Agro-Biodiversity, U.N. FOOD & 
AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/FOCUS/E/Women/biodiv-e.htm (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2011). 
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plants.223  Furthermore, the genetic base of these crops is 
alarmingly narrow.  Genetically uniform, high-yielding varieties 
have displaced traditional varieties for 70 percent of the world’s 
corn; 50 percent of the wheat in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; 
and 75 percent of Asian rice.224  The replacement of biodiverse 
agroecosystems by monocultures is destroying the reservoir of 
genetic diversity necessary to enable local farmers and the global 
food supply to recover from serious environmental disturbances—
including the floods, droughts, and other dislocations associated 
with climate change.225
The cultivation of uniform crop varieties also increases 
vulnerability to pest and disease infestation (because different 
crops and different genetic strains of a particular crop may be more 
resistant to certain pests), depletes the soil of vital nutrients, 
requires the use of environmentally harmful chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides, and impairs human nutrition by reducing the 
varieties of foods consumed.
 
226  The expansion of export 
monocultures as a consequence of agro-export led development 
strategies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank has imposed 
severe environmental costs on a wide range of developing 
countries.  These costs include deforestation, unsustainable uses of 
freshwater resources, agrochemical contamination of groundwater 
and surface waters, and greater pesticide-related illnesses.227
 
223 See First Fruits of Plant Gene Pact, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/0/item/20162/icode/en/ (last visited Feb. 28, 
2011). 
 
224 See Christopher M. Picone & David Van Tassel, Agriculture and Biodiversity 
Loss: Industrial Agriculture, in LIFE ON EARTH: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIODIVERSITY, 
ECOLOGY, AND EVOLUTION 99, 100 (Niles Eldredge ed., 2002). 
225 See LORI ANN THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY: AGROBIODIVERSITY AND 
FOOD SECURITY 5 (1998) (summarizing the importance of biodiversity for 
agricultural production and food security); PLATFORM FOR AGROBIODIVERSITY RES. 
(PAR) CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECT, COPING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE: THE USE OF 
AGROBIODIVERSITY BY INDIGENOUS AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 19 (Sept. 2009), available 
at http://www.agrobiodiversityplatform.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009 
/09/PAR_climate-change_briefing_web.pdf (noting that “[r]evitalising and 
supporting local food traditions and indigenous food systems based on 
agricultural biodiversity” may contribute to climate change adaptation and help 
prevent food crises). 
226 See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 87, at 82–83 (enumerating the risks 
associated with lack of crop diversity); THRUPP, supra note 225, at 26–32 
(describing the ecosystem effects of cultivation of uniform crops). 
227 See MICHAEL E. CONROY ET AL., A CAUTIONARY TALE: FAILED U.S. 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 13–14, 18–19, 124–25, 138–39 (Peter M. 
Rosset ed., 1996) (examining the environmental impacts of agro-export 
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5.4. Failure to Internalize Social and Environmental Costs 
The theory of comparative advantage fails to recognize that 
market prices distort comparative advantage by not taking into 
account social and environmental externalities.  As the Mexican 
case study illustrates, the market price for U.S. corn did not take 
into account the significant environmental consequences of 
monocultural corn production, including soil erosion, increased 
agrochemical use, water pollution due to pesticide and fertilizer 
runoff, and depletion of aquifers used for irrigation; conversely, 
the market price for Mexican corn failed to reflect the social and 
environmental benefits of traditional corn cultivation, including 
the protection of biodiversity and the well-being of Mexico’s 
indigenous farming communities.228
5.5. Distortions in Market Prices Caused by Market Concentration 
  In theory, eliminating trade 
barriers should promote efficiency and make everyone better off 
by identifying the lowest cost producer of a particular commodity.  
In practice, trade liberalization in the agricultural sector made 
everyone worse off by misidentifying the United States as the most 
efficient corn producer, thereby increasing harm to human health 
and the environment in Mexico and the United States, 
undermining the livelihoods of indigenous corn farmers in Mexico, 
and jeopardizing an irreplaceable resource—Mexico’s genetic 
diversity.  Contrary to the theory of comparative advantage, 
liberalized trade based on market prices rather than on true social 
and environmental costs can promote global inefficiency. 
Finally, the theory of comparative advantage assumes perfect 
competition and neglects to account for market distortions caused 
 
specialization in Central America); LORI ANN THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS FOR 
GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS: CHALLENGES IN LATIN AMERICA’S AGRICULTURAL EXPORT 
BOOM 17–18, 94–96, 102, 106–08, 112 (1995) (describing the environmental 
consequences of agro-export production in the developing world); Gonzalez, 
supra note 49, at 469–70 (describing the environmental impact of agricultural trade 
liberalization and agro-export production in the Global South); STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY REVIEW INT’L NETWORK (SAPRIN), THE POLICY ROOTS 
OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY: A MULTI-COUNTRY PARTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT 
OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 124–25 (2002), available at http://www.saprin.org 
/SAPRI_Findings.pdf (discussing the environmental impacts of structural 
adjustment in several developing countries).   
228 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 25–26 (lamenting the failure of markets 
to take into account the positive and negative externalities associated with corn 
production in the United States and Mexico). 
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by the domination of agricultural trade by a small number of 
transnational corporations.229  Two corporations control seventy-
five percent of the world’s grain trade.230  Six agrochemical 
companies control seventy-five percent of global agrochemical 
sales.231  Ten corporations control sixty-seven percent of 
proprietary seed sales, nearly ninety percent of the agrochemical 
market, and forty percent of retail grocery sales.232  Similar market 
concentrations exist for other commodities, including coffee, tea, 
sugar, cocoa and bananas.233
The market power of transnational corporations enables them 
to manipulate market prices so as to maximize profits—paying 
farmers relatively low prices for crops while maintaining high 
prices on the food products purchased by consumers.
  
234  The 
distortions caused by market concentration were evident in the 
Mexican corn case study.  The Mexican government assumed that 
NAFTA-induced decreases in domestic corn prices would benefit 
consumers by reducing tortilla prices.235
 
229 See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 102, at 119 (discussing the assumption of 
perfect competition). 
  However, since two 
Mexican firms controlled ninety-seven percent of the corn flour 
230 BILL VORLEY, FOOD, INC.: CORPORATE CONCENTRATION FROM FARM TO 
CONSUMER 39 (U.K. Food Grp. ed., 2003), available at http://www.ukfg.org.uk 
/docs/UKFG-Foodinc-Nov03.pdf. 
231 Who Owns Nature: Corporate Power and the Final Frontier in the 
Commodification of Life, COMMUNIQUÉ (Action Grp. on Erosion, Tech., and 
Concentration, Ottawa, Can.), Nov. 2008, at 15, available at http://www.etcgroup 
.org/upload/publication/707/01/etc_won_report_final_color.pdf (charting the 
percentages). 
232 Id. at 4. 
233 Brian Halweil, Farming in the Public Interest, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2002, 
51, 68 (Worldwatch Inst. ed., 2002) (charting the percentages). 
234 See generally Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Agribusiness and the Right to Food, U.N. Human Rights Council, 13th Sess., ¶ 9, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33 (Dec. 22, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org 
/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-33.pdf (describing the 
power imbalances in food systems that disadvantage consumers and producers); 
SOPHIA MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND: MARKETS, FARMERS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21-29, 32 (Inst. for Agric. & Trade Policy, 2002), available at 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?RefID=25497 (analyzing the 
market power of transnational agribusiness); PATEL & MEMARSADEGHI, supra note 
94, at 34–36 (discussing the negative consequences of corporate domination of the 
food supply); PETER M. ROSSET, FOOD IS DIFFERENT: WHY WE MUST GET THE WTO 
OUT OF AGRICULTURE 45–49 (2006) (discussing the impact on small farmers and 
consumers of concentration in agricultural markets). 
235 See Nadal, supra note 81, at 147 (discussing the Mexican government’s 
assumptions regarding the effects of NAFTA). 
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industry, tortilla prices increased substantially despite the 
significant drop in corn prices.236
The problem of market concentration is compounded when 
companies control multiple stages of the production process 
through ownership of other firms or through joint ventures 
(“vertical integration”).
 
237  For example, the companies that 
dominate the grain trade tend to be vertically integrated 
conglomerates that use grain in the production of livestock and 
processed food.238  Because the processing of corn, the production 
of feed, and the raising and slaughter of livestock are internal to 
the company, market forces do not dictate prices until the 
processed meat is actually sold in supermarkets.239  This enables 
these companies to capture enormous profits, measured in the 
spread between prices paid to corn farmers and wholesale meat 
prices.240  When grain prices plummeted in the early 2000s, the 
price of processed meat sold in supermarkets remained the 
same.241  When grain prices soared during the food price crisis of 
2008, small farmers did not benefit because input prices increased 
as well and because many small farmers sell to intermediaries 
rather than on international markets.242
Finally, transnational agribusiness firms possess superior 
market information due to their world-wide operations, and this 
market information, combined with significant amounts of capital, 
enables them to utilize futures and options markets to influence 
market prices and maximize profits.
 
243
 
236 See Nadal & Wise, supra note 84, at 26 (surmising that “imperfect price 
transmission is due to oligopoly market structures in the corn flour industry”). 
 
237 See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., TRADE REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY: 
CONCEPTUALIZING THE LINKAGES 122 (2003), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep 
/fao/005/y4671e/y4671e00.pdf (defining and giving examples of vertical 
integration in the food industry). 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. 
242 See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY 
MARKETS: HIGH FOOD PRICES AND THE FOOD CRISIS EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS 
LEARNED 34–35 (2009), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i0854e 
/i0854e00.htm (explaining that higher commodity prices were offset by increases 
in input costs and that these higher commodity prices are less likely to reach small 
farmers who are not well-integrated into commercial markets). 
243 See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 237, at 122–23 (describing the 
operations of transnational food corporations). 
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In sum, market prices misidentify comparative advantage 
because they are distorted by the market power of transnational 
agribusiness.  Even if the United States and the European Union 
were to eliminate all subsidies and tariffs, these market distortions 
would remain.  Even the World Bank has acknowledged that 
producers of seven basic commodities were underpaid as much as 
$96 billion between 1975 and 1993 due to the market power of 
transnational agricultural enterprises.244  Regrettably, the trade 
liberalization agenda of the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO 
focuses on market distortions caused by governments and ignores 
market distortions caused by transnational agribusiness.  Indeed, 
the neoliberal economic reforms promoted by these institutions 
deprive developing country governments of the ability to mitigate 
the power of transnational agribusiness by prohibiting or 
restricting the use of subsidies and tariffs to nurture domestic agro-
export enterprises or to protect domestic farmers from foreign 
competition.245
6. TOWARD AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE APPROACH TO TRADE 
POLICY 
  In so doing, the neoliberal economic model 
reinforces the power of transnational agribusiness at the expense of 
small farmers, indigenous peoples, and consumers. 
The critique of comparative advantage set forth in the 
preceding section underscores the importance of being attentive to 
the limitations of economic theory when designing trade policy.  
Rather than liberalizing trade in accordance with one-size-fits-all 
economic models, policy-makers should utilize trade as a means of 
achieving important social ends, including environmental 
protection and the promotion of human rights.  This Part outlines 
several key elements of an environmental justice approach to trade 
policy and then examines each element in greater detail.  
Environmental justice at the international level is grounded in 
human rights, including:  the rights to life, health, and cultural 
integrity; the right to a healthy environment; the right to self-
determination; and the right to be free from racial 
 
244 See id. at 124. 
245 See Gonzalez, supra note 49, at 490–92 (explaining how trade liberalization 
reinforces the economic power of the transnational corporations that dominate the 
global food system). 
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discrimination.246  An environmental justice approach to trade 
policy must ensure that international trade is regulated in a 
manner that respects, protects, and fulfills fundamental human 
rights—both universal human rights and the distinctive rights of 
indigenous peoples.  As the Mexican case study illustrates, trade 
liberalization imposes particular risks on traditional land-based 
cultures whose collective identities are rooted to their ancestral 
territories and resources.  At a minimum, an environmental justice 
approach to trade policy must impose an affirmative duty on 
governments to refrain from assuming obligations under trade 
agreements that would deprive indigenous communities of their 
rights to subsistence, self-determination and cultural integrity.247
A major challenge posed by trade policy is liability for 
extraterritorial harm.  For example, should the United States be 
responsible for human rights violations in Mexico occasioned by 
the combination of U.S. agro-export dumping and Mexican trade 
liberalization?  An environmental justice approach to trade policy 
must address the extraterritorial scope of human rights and 
environmental obligations in order to ensure that countries with 
disproportionate influence over the outcome of trade negotiations 
are held accountable for extraterritorial consequences.
   
248
Environmental justice advocates have long recognized the 
importance of giving communities adequate information and a 
meaningful opportunity to participate in decisions that affect their 
  
 
246 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The 
International Environmental Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. REV. 583, 626 (2007) (discussing human rights law as the legal foundation for 
international environmental justice claims). 
247 Professor Rebecca Tsosie argues for an analogous obligation in the context 
of climate change.  She proposes a right to environmental self-determination, 
which would enable indigenous peoples to “maintain their unique cultural and 
political status as the peoples of traditional lands since before the establishment of 
current national boundaries.”  This right would impose an affirmative obligation 
on nation-states to mitigate climate change to avoid catastrophic harm to 
indigenous lands and resources.  Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1674. 
248 Like climate change, trade policy can impose injuries on indigenous 
communities that are not subject to redress through traditional self-determination 
rights based on territorial control because the injury is caused by activities outside 
the boundaries of indigenous lands and outside national borders.  See Tsosie, 
supra note 17, at 1644 (“[T]he problem of climate change cannot be resolved 
through recognition of Native sovereignty, because the environmental harms are 
largely occurring beyond the boundaries of [Native] lands.”)  An environmental 
justice approach to trade policy must therefore develop theories of responsibility 
for extraterritorial harm. 
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health, resources, and livelihoods.249
 Finally, one of the objectives of environmental justice is to 
promote equitable distribution of environmental amenities and to 
ensure that no community is disproportionately burdened by 
environmental hazards.
  An environmental justice 
approach to trade policy must provide for ex ante environmental 
and human rights impact assessment of trade agreements, and 
must enable communities potentially affected by trade agreements 
to participate in the assessment process and to comment on draft 
trade agreement negotiating texts. 
250
Environmental justice emphasizes the environment as a 
social good rather than a commodity or purely economic 
asset.  The focus is on the proper allocation of social 
benefits and burdens, both in the present and in the future.  
Thus, it requires equitable distribution of environmental 
amenities and environmental risks, the redress and 
sanctioning of environmental abuses, the restoration and 
conservation of nature and the fair allocation of resource 
benefits.
  As Professor Dinah Shelton observes: 
251
An environmental justice approach to trade policy must 
examine the ways in which international trade distributes 
economic and environmental benefits and burdens, and must seek 
to mitigate North-South inequality as well as inequities within 
nations.  Such an analysis is necessarily interdisciplinary, multi-
faceted, and context-specific.  It should result in proposals for 
scaling back the inordinate influence of wealthy countries in 
international economic relations, for mitigating the power of 
transnational corporations, and for recognizing alternatives to the 
dominant development paradigm.  An environmental justice 
framework must also acknowledge the heterogeneity of the 
communities affected by trade policy in order to craft solutions 
  
 
249 See Gonzalez, supra note 246, at 639–41 (discussing the right of those 
potentially affected by environmental degradation to have a say in the 
developmental decisions that may lead to harm). 
250 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition: 
Agricultural Trade Policy Through an Environmental Justice Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L 
L. 345, 378 (2006) (articulating the elements of an environmental justice analysis at 
the international level).   
251 Dinah Shelton, The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human 
Rights Tribunals, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 23 (Romina 
Picolotti & Jorge D. Taillant eds., 2003). 
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that take into account each community’s distinct history, culture, 
goals, needs, identity, and relationship to the environment.252
While an analysis of the specific indigenous communities in 
Mexico affected by NAFTA is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
remainder of this Article explains in greater detail the elements of 
an environmental justice approach to trade policy outlined above.  
 
6.1. Obligation to Fulfill Human Rights and Environmental Norms 
An environmental justice approach to trade policy must begin 
by recognizing the obligation of all states to regulate international 
trade in a manner that promotes human rights.253  While human 
rights norms with jus cogens status (prohibitions on genocide, 
torture, slavery, and systemic racial discrimination) 
unquestionably trump conflicting international law rules of lesser 
status,254 two arguments have traditionally been advanced to 
justify the hierarchical superiority of human rights norms more 
generally.255
First, as members of the Organization of the United Nations, all 
states have pledged to “take joint and separate action in 
cooperation with the Organization” to promote “universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
 
 
252 See Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1653–54 (discussing the distinctive rights of 
indigenous peoples as opposed to racial and ethnic minorities); Yamamoto & 
Lyman, supra, note 18, at 333–41 (calling for a nuanced environmental justice 
analysis that considers each subordinated group’s history, culture, values, and 
interactions with other white, racialized, and indigenous groups). 
253 See BERTA E. HERNÁNDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW 
COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 277 (2009) (“[A] special 
responsibility to seek consistency between trade and human rights rules exists 
because of the universal recognition that human rights treaties define the 
standards of right and wrong treatment of civil society”); Gonzalez, supra note 
246, at 626–27 (discussing the reasons for according international human rights 
law primacy over conflicting legal norms); see also Gonzalez, supra note 24, at 
1014–15 (explaining the importance of human rights law as a means of interjecting 
environmental justice into the trade and environment debate). 
254 See HERNÁNDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 67 (describing the 
hierarchy of human rights norms in relation to other types of international law 
obligations). 
255 See Olivier De Schutter, A Human Rights Approach to Trade and Investment 
Policies, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE: TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES 14, 15 (2009), available at 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=107049 (entire volume 
available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/) (summarizing the two 
traditional justifications for the hierarchical superiority of human rights law over 
other norms of international law). 
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for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”256  
Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that the obligations of UN 
member states under the UN Charter shall prevail in the event of a 
conflict with obligations under any other international 
agreement.257  It logically follows that obligations under trade 
agreements must be set aside to the extent that they conflict with 
human rights norms.258
Second, human rights law is hierarchically superior to 
obligations flowing from trade agreements because it is premised 
on the natural law notion of the inherent dignity and worth of 
every individual, and is therefore not subject to compromise in the 
pursuit of other social objectives, including economic efficiency.
 
259  
Unlike trade agreements, human rights treaties do not involve 
reciprocal exchanges of obligations among contracting states.260  
Rather, human rights norms are designed to codify the 
fundamental rights that groups and individual possess by virtue of 
their humanity.  The inalienable nature of human rights claims and 
their recognition in a variety of human rights conventions and 
other legal instruments require the interpretation of trade law in a 
manner that promotes human rights.261
 
256 See U.N. Charter, arts. 1(3), 55–56, 59 (calling upon states to promote 
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion). 
  Thus, in the Case of the 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights rejected Paraguay’s claim that a bilateral 
investment treaty precluded the country from giving effect to the 
indigenous community’s property rights over ancestral lands.  The 
257 Id. art. 103. 
258 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 15 (explaining why human rights norms 
should prevail over international trade norms in the event of a conflict). 
259 See Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the 
Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 51, 69–76 (1999) (examining the 
normative underpinnings of human rights law and arguing for the hierarchical 
superiority of human rights law over international economic law).  
260 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 16 (explaining that human rights 
obligations “do not primarily define obligations owed to other states” and are 
thus “not reducible to bilateral exchanges between contracting states”). 
261 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the 
Constitution of International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407, 410–11 (2003) (“[T]he 
universal recognition . . . of inalienable human rights deriving from human 
dignity can be understood as requiring the interpretation of national and 
international law as a functional unity for promoting individual and democratic 
autonomy and diversity.”); De Schutter, supra note 255, at 16 (discussing the 
relationship between international trade law and human rights law). 
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court noted that the enforcement of bilateral commercial treaties 
“should always be compatible with the American Convention, 
which is a multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class 
of its own and that generates rights for individual human beings 
and does not depend entirely on reciprocity among states.”262
At a minimum, human rights law must inform the 
interpretation of trade agreements because it forms part of the 
corpus of public international law of which international trade law 
is a part.
 
263
Human rights must guide the interpretation, not only of the 
WTO’s ‘exceptions’ and safeguard clauses, but also of the 
interpretation of the basic WTO guarantees of freedom, 
non-discrimination, property rights and the rule of law 
which protect corresponding human rights values of 
individual liberty, non-discrimination, private property and 
access to courts.
  As Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann observes:   
264
The special status of human rights norms can be best 
acknowledged by including a hierarchy of norms clause in trade 
agreements specifying that human rights norms will prevail in the 
event of a conflict with trade norms.
 
265  Because the protection of 
air, water, and other natural resources is necessary to the 
realization of human rights (including the right to life and the right 
to health), environmental rights and obligations should likewise 
receive hierarchical priority.266
 
262 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 146, ¶ 140 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
  This approach is not 
263 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 67–69 (discussing the 
application of human rights law to WTO disputes). 
264 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for 
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from 
European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621, 645 (2002). 
265 See Gonzalez, supra note 246, at 627–28 (recommending that trade 
agreements include a hierarchy of norms clause that recognizes the primacy of 
human rights law). 
266 See, e.g., HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 86–88 (“The 
rights to life and to health . . . would not be possible without clean water, clean 
air, and adequate food and shelter, all of which are dependent on a healthy 
environment.”); Dinah Shelton, Developing Substantive Environmental Rights, 1 J. 
HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 89, 97–115 (2010) (describing the use of international 
environmental law norms by human rights tribunals to effect the fulfillment of 
various rights linked to environmental protection); United Nations Conference on 
Environment & Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, 
art. 15.2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. II) (June 13, 1992) (pointing out that the 
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unprecedented.  NAFTA already contains a hierarchy of norms 
clause that privileges certain enumerated environmental treaties 
should they conflict with NAFTA requirements.267  In the absence 
of a hierarchy of norms clause, states may hesitate to fulfill their 
obligations under human rights and environmental treaties for fear 
of violating trade agreements and exposing themselves to 
economic sanctions.268
6.2. Flexibility in Trade Agreements 
 
An environmental justice approach to trade policy calls for 
flexible terms and generous exceptions in trade agreements in 
order to enable countries to fulfill human rights and environmental 
obligations.  Because the Mexican corn case study involves the 
rights of indigenous peoples, this section will identify some of the 
applicable human rights norms and will then discuss the relevance 
of these norms to trade agreements.   
Indigenous peoples are entitled to a panoply of rights under 
international law, including those contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,269 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),270
 
loss of biological diversity jeopardizes natural resources essential to the provision 
of food, clothing, medicine, housing, and spiritual nourishment). 
 and the International 
267 See NAFTA, supra note 111, art. 104 (specifying which environmental 
treaties take priority over NAFTA in case of inconsistencies between the 
agreements).  
268 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 21 (describing how the fragmentation of 
international law into areas such as “trade law,” “investment law,” and “human 
rights law” may lead states to prioritize compliance with trade and investment 
norms because these are enforceable through economic sanctions). 
269 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 
3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (delineating rights 
to which all human beings are entitled, including the rights to life, liberty, 
freedom from servitude, freedom from arbitrary invasion of privacy, and freedom 
of movement).  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, and is widely regarded 
as a legally binding codification of general principles of international law, or 
alternatively as customary international law.  See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 
15. 
270 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (listing civil and political rights to which all 
people are entitled, including the right to assemble, due process rights, electoral 
rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion).  Both Mexico and the United 
States are parties to this treaty and are therefore bound by its obligations.  See 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Status of Ratifications as of 
November 25, 2010, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).271  
Article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR acknowledges the 
fundamental human right of all peoples to self-determination 
(which includes the right to “freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development”) and prohibits states from interfering 
with a population’s “own means of subsistence.”272  Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR each prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, or 
other status.273  The rights to life, health, and well-being are 
recognized in articles 3 and 25 of the Universal Declaration, article 
6 of the ICCPR, and article 12 of the ICESCR.274
 
/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en 
#EndDec (listing the signatories to the ICCPR). 
  Other significant 
human rights treaties include the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), 
271 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (detailing economic, social, and cultural 
rights to which all people are entitled, including the right to social security, the 
right to family life, and the right to an adequate standard of living).  Mexico is a 
party to this treaty.  The United States is a signatory, and is therefore obligated to 
act consistently with the treaty’s object and purpose.  See International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Status of Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (listing the 
signatories to the ICESCR).  
272 ICCPR, supra note 270, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 270, art. 1; see also 
Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 
228–34 (2001) (discussing the evolution of the law of self-determination under the 
ICCPR and ICESCR as applied to indigenous peoples);  Tsosie, supra note 17, at 
1664–66 (explaining the evolution of the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination). 
273 See UDHR, supra note 269, art. 2 (providing that regardless of race, color, 
or national or social origin, everyone is entitled to the rights set out in the other 
articles); ICCPR, supra note 270, art. 2 (providing that regardless of race, color, or 
national or social origin, everyone is entitled to the rights set out in the ICCPR); 
ICESCR, supra note 271, art. 2 (providing that regardless of race, color, or national 
or social origin, everyone is entitled to the rights set out in the ICESCR).  
274 See UDHR, supra note 269, arts. 3, 25 (recognizing the rights to life, liberty, 
security of person, and an adequate standard of living); ICCPR, supra note 270, 
art. 6 (limiting the conditions under which someone can be sentenced to death); 
ICESCR, supra note 271, art. 12 (recognizing the right to physical and mental 
health).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/1
GONZALEZ.DOC 3/18/2011  3:16 PM 
2011] MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS 781 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.275
International human rights law also identifies certain rights 
specific to indigenous peoples.  International Labor Organization 
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (“ILO Convention 169”)
 
276 and the United 
Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples277 codify 
existing customary international human rights norms specific to 
indigenous peoples.278
 
275 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 56 (listing significant 
human rights treaties).   
  These include the right to cultural 
276 See International Labour Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1384 
(1989) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169] (delineating the minimum human 
rights standards applicable to indigenous peoples); see also ILO Convention No. 169 
Table of Ratifications, INT’L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (indicating that, as of November 25, 
2010, ILO Convention No. 169 had been ratified by twenty-two countries, 
including Mexico.  The United States is not yet a party to this treaty). 
277 See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP), G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) 
[hereinafter UNDRIP] (recognizing the distinctive rights of indigenous peoples); 
Press Release, General Assembly Dep’t of Pub. Info., UN General Assembly 
Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Press Release 10/10612 
(Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007 
/ga10612.doc.htm (indicating that the Declaration was approved by 143 nations, 
including Mexico, but was opposed by four nations with large indigenous 
populations: the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia).  However, 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia subsequently switched their votes and 
endorsed the Declaration, leaving the United States as the lone holdout.  In 
December 2010, the Obama Administration announced that it was reversing the 
position of the Bush administration and would endorse the Declaration.  See 
Valerie Richardson, Obama Adopts U.N. Manifesto on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010 
/dec/16/obama-adopts-un-manifesto-on-rights-of-indigenous-/ (last visited Feb. 
28, 2011). 
278 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49–58 
(1996) (discussing ILO Convention 169 and other legal instruments as evidence of 
customary international law regarding the rights of indigenous peoples); S. James 
Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the 
Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 14–15 (2009) (discussing the 
evolution of customary international law with respect to the rights of indigenous 
peoples); Anaya & Williams, supra note 20, at 53–74 (analyzing the emerging 
customary international law norms regarding the rights of indigenous peoples); 
Mauro Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 58 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 
957, 962–63, 972–77 (2009) (explaining that the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples crystallizes and restates diverse legal norms related 
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integrity,279 the right to lands and resources traditionally owned, 
occupied, or otherwise used,280 the right to determine their own 
economic development priorities,281 the right to be consulted and 
to participate in decisions regarding development projects that 
may affect them,282 the right to the secure enjoyment of their means 
of subsistence,283 and the right to the conservation of their 
environment and of the productive capacity of their lands.284  
Similar rights are guaranteed under the Inter-American human 
rights system.285  In addition, articles 10 and 8(j) of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity require states to respect the traditional 
practices of indigenous and local communities that are compatible 
with the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.286
Even if trade agreements contain a hierarchy of norms 
provision recognizing the primacy of human rights and 
environmental obligations, states may nevertheless be reluctant to 
adopt measures not strictly required by environmental or human 
rights treaties if these measures might expose them to retaliation 
 
 
to indigenous peoples’ rights that have been recognized at the international, 
regional, and national level). 
279 See UNDRIP, supra note 277, art. 11 (recognizing indigenous peoples’ right 
to practice their cultural traditions and customs); ILO Convention No. 169, supra 
note 276, art. 5 (protecting the integrity of indigenous peoples’ social, religious, 
and spiritual values and practices). 
280 See UNDRIP, supra note 277, art 26 (protecting indigenous peoples’ rights 
to lands, territories, and resources); ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 276, arts. 
13–19 (protecting indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and natural resources). 
281 See UNDRIP, supra note 277, art. 32 (recognizing indigenous peoples’ 
rights to determine priorities and strategies for the development of their lands 
and resources); ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 276, art. 7 (recognizing 
indigenous peoples’ rights to determine their own development priorities). 
282 See UNDRIP, supra note 277 arts. 18–19 (recognizing indigenous peoples’ 
rights to participation, consultation, and free, prior and informed consent on 
matters that may affect them); ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 276, art. 6 
(recognizing indigenous peoples’ rights to be consulted on matters that may affect 
them). 
283 See UNDRIP, supra note 277, art. 20 (recognizing the right of indigenous 
peoples to secure subsistence). 
284 See id. art. 29 (recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to the 
conservation of their environment); ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 276, art. 4 
(recognizing indigenous peoples’ rights to the safeguarding of their environment). 
285 See generally Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Evolution of International Indigenous 
Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 281 (2006). 
286 See Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818, arts. 10, 8(j) (1992); 
List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
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from trading partners for violating trade commitments.287  For 
example, as the NAFTA case study illustrates, one of the recurring 
risks faced by developing countries is that low-priced agricultural 
imports will drive small farmers off the land.288  For indigenous 
peoples, separation from their lands, resources, and lifeways poses 
a threat not only to their subsistence rights but also to their unique 
cultural identity.289
If trade agreements are to advance rather than frustrate 
environmental justice, it is essential that they give developing 
countries ample flexibility to protect the lands, livelihoods, and 
resources of indigenous and rural communities.  In the Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations, developing countries have sought 
greater latitude to utilize tariffs, import restrictions, and subsidies 
to promote food security and rural development as well as the 
right to exclude agricultural commodities of greatest importance to 
domestic nutritional needs and rural livelihoods (such as corn and 
beans in the case of Mexico) from trade liberalization 
commitments.
  In the absence of provisions in trade 
agreements expressly authorizing states to raise tariffs or impose 
other import barriers in order to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
rights of indigenous peoples, developing countries may be 
unwilling to take such measures for fear of violating the terms of 
trade agreements. 
290
 
287 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 21 (describing the risk inherent in trying 
to navigate the complicated relationship between human rights law and 
trade/investment treaty obligations). 
  Incorporating flexibility mechanisms into the 
substantive terms of trade agreements will promote environmental 
justice by giving developing countries greater “policy space” to 
address the structural inequities in agricultural trade that threaten 
288 See Olivier De Schutter, International Trade in Agriculture and the Right to 
Food, 46 DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION 43 (2009) (describing the importance of 
retaining the freedom to take measures to protect domestic markets from 
international markets). 
289 See Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1645 (noting the devastating impact of 
relocation on the cultures and lifeways of indigenous peoples due to the link 
between geographical location and indigenous identity). 
290 See Tobias Reichert, Agricultural Trade Liberalization in Multilateral and 
Bilateral Trade Negotiations, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE: TOWARDS A HUMAN 
RIGHTS APPROACH TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES 29, 34–36 (2009), available at 
http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/the-global-food-challenge 
/pdf (describing the proposals of developing countries during the Doha Round of 
WTO negotiations). 
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biological diversity as well as the economic and cultural survival of 
indigenous peoples. 
In addition to flexible terms, trade agreements should also 
contain broad human rights and environmental exceptions and 
simplified waiver provisions.291  For example, Article XX of the 
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) contains a 
series of exceptions that permit derogations from GATT norms in 
order to protect public health, welfare, and the environment.292  
While these exceptions do not explicitly mention human rights and 
have been interpreted quite narrowly by some dispute resolution 
panels, they represent an important first step toward harmonizing 
trade, human rights, and environmental norms.293  Trade 
agreements should also contain simplified waiver procedures in 
the event that unanticipated circumstances require states to violate 
trade norms in ways that do not fall squarely within existing 
exceptions.  Such waiver provisions have been used under the 
WTO framework, most recently to waive the obligations of least 
developed countries under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) in order to enable 
these countries to obtain medications needed to combat certain 
epidemics, particularly HIV.294
Finally, flexible terms and broad exceptions are useless if 
countries lack the political will to implement them.  For example, 
Mexican policy-makers failed to avail themselves of the fifteen-
year transition period for the phase-out of corn tariffs that had 
been negotiated to shield indigenous peasants from the 
devastating impacts of U.S. agro-export dumping.
   
295
 
291 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 22-23 (discussing the GATT exception 
clauses and flexibility mechanisms). 
  Even after the 
transition period expired in 2008, there were additional measures 
that Mexico might have implemented without running afoul of 
292 See The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, G1 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (articulating general exceptions to GATT obligations).  
293 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 90–93, 95–98, 112–13 
(discussing the interpretation of the GATT art. XX exceptions in dispute 
resolution proceedings).  
294 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 23 (providing examples of waivers 
under the GATT/WTO system). 
295 See Nadal, supra note 81, at 149 (explaining that the Mexican government 
exempted U.S. corn imports from tariffs thirty months after the effective date of 
NAFTA despite the fact that NAFTA authorized a fifteen-year phase-out of corn 
tariffs). 
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NAFTA to protect the livelihoods of its indigenous rural 
population.  Mexico could have imposed countervailing duties on 
U.S. corn to mitigate economic injury to domestic producers 
caused by U.S. agricultural subsidies.296  Likewise, Mexico could 
have provided greater government support for small farmers since 
Mexico’s current subsidy levels remain billions of dollars below the 
country’s WTO limits.297  Recognizing these omissions as violations 
of fundamental human rights to subsistence, self-determination, 
cultural integrity, and environmental health may deter misguided 
efforts to “modernize” the agricultural sector in accordance with 
the dictates of comparative advantage.  Human rights declarations 
and covenants carry significant moral authority that can be 
marshaled by social movements to draw global attention to abuses 
and injustices.298  Moreover, regional and global human rights 
tribunals, while lacking the compliance record of trade and 
investment dispute settlement bodies, do generate definitive 
rulings on complaints, and these rulings carry significant 
normative authority.299  Indeed, indigenous activists in Mexico 
have consciously deployed the terminology of human rights, and 
have made use of international tribunals in order to strengthen the 
appeal of their demands and to influence the behavior of the 
Mexican state.300
 
296 See Timothy A. Wise, Policy Space for Mexican Maize: Protecting Agro-
biodiversity by Promoting Rural Livelihoods 10–12 (Global Dev. & Env’t Inst., 
Working Paper No. 07–01, 2007) (explaining that a subsidy that exceeds five 
percent of the value of the traded good is considered actionable and concluding, 
based on an analysis of U.S. corn subsidies, that Mexico can legitimately impose 
countervailing duties on U.S. corn). 
 
297 See id. at 13–14 (comparing Mexico’s actual agricultural subsidy levels to 
the levels authorized under the WTO framework and concluding that Mexico can 
increase agricultural subsidies by $12 billion without running afoul of its WTO 
commitments). 
298 See Conor Gearty, Do Human Rights Help or Hinder Environmental 
Protection?, 1 J. HUM. RTS & ENV’T. 7, 14, 17, 20 (2010) (providing examples of 
environmental movements’ use of the moral authority of human rights discourse 
to promote environmental protection); JUNG, supra note 25, at 10–11 (discussing 
indigenous identity and indigenous rights as the basis of a powerful moral 
critique of neoliberal globalization). 
299 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 87 (recognizing that 
while human rights enforcement mechanisms do not have the highest level of 
compliance, definitive rulings are issued in response to complaints). 
300 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 188–90 (describing the use of human rights 
norms and institutions by the Mexican indigenous rights movement in order to 
challenge the policies of the Mexican government). 
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6.3. Responsibility for Extraterritorial Harm 
An environmental justice approach to trade policy requires the 
recognition of the extraterritorial scope of human rights norms and 
of the duty to provide reparations for human rights abuses.  States 
are legally obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill the human 
rights of persons located within their borders, but the duty to 
respect human rights also extends extraterritorially.301
States are bound to contribute to the aims of the UN 
Charter, and to respect human rights either as customary 
international law or as general principles of law, in all their 
activities, whether these activities affect the human rights of 
their own population or whether they affect the enjoyment 
of human rights abroad.
  As Olivier 
de Schutter, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
explains: 
302
The extraterritorial nature of human rights obligations is derived 
from the customary international law principle articulated in the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration
 
303 that prohibits states from using or 
permitting the use of their territory so as to cause harm to property 
or persons located in the territory of another state.304  In that case, 
an arbitration panel awarded damages and injunctive relief against 
Canada for damages to crops and forests in the United States 
caused by air pollution from a Canadian smelter located in Trail, 
British Columbia.305  The duty to refrain from causing 
extraterritorial harm, reaffirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration306 and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,307
 
301 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 16–18 (explaining that human rights law 
imposes obligations on states not just toward persons residing within national 
borders but also toward persons located outside the nation’s territory); 
HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 286–88 (discussing the 
extraterritorial scope of human rights obligations).  
 
302 De Schutter, supra note 255, at 18. 
303 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963–81 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1941). 
304 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 287 (explaining the 
implications of the Trail Smelter case for human rights law). 
305 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. at 1907. 
306 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development noted that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
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applies not only to environmental damage, but also to human 
rights violations arising from trade and investment agreements.308
In the context of international economic relations, the power of 
affluent nations to determine the domestic policy of less 
prosperous states justifies the imposition of extraterritorial human 
rights obligations.  Created after World War II at the behest of the 
major powers, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT/WTO 
exercise no less control over civil society in every state than states 
exercise over their own populations.
 
309  Regrettably, the policies of 
these institutions have had devastating consequences in the Global 
South, including harmful impacts on wages, prices, employment, 
social services, migration, human health, and access to basic 
environmental necessities such as food, land, and water.310
By perpetuating a global order whose foreseeable effects 
are widespread human rights harms and whose 
ramifications are avoidable because viable alternatives exist 
that do not cause these human rights harms, affluent states 
have caused harm to others—have in fact committed 
human rights violations.  For these reasons, the major trade 
powers have a negative duty to ameliorate the human 
  As 
Professors Hernandez-Truyol and Powell point out: 
 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 13–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I, Principle 2 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter 
Rio Declaration]. 
307 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 
Ch. 1, Principle 21 (June 16, 1972). 
308 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 17–19 (explaining that the duty to 
refrain from causing transboundary harm articulated in the Trail Smelter case is 
not limited to environmental damage, but applies with equal force to 
extraterritorial human rights violations aided or abetted by states through trade 
and investment agreements); HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 287 
(stating that the Trail Smelter principle extends beyond environmental harm to 
human rights violations). 
309 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 288–89 (discussing 
the origin, purpose, and impact of the IMF, the World Bank and the 
GATT/WTO). 
310 See Gonzalez, supra note 49, at 457–69 (discussing specific ways in which 
these institutions’ policies have negatively affected developing countries). 
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rights harm that their global institutional order has 
caused.311
Applying these insights to NAFTA, one of the ways that the 
United States can mitigate the human rights violations caused by 
its trade policies and by the structural adjustment policies of the 
IMF and the World Bank is to promote regional integration with 
Mexico on mutually beneficial terms through a program of 
adjustment assistance.  Indeed, this is precisely the approach to 
regional integration pioneered by the European Union.  The 
European Union invests billions of euros to raise living standards 
and improve infrastructure in countries awaiting EU membership 
in order to create the social and political foundation for EU 
accession.
 
312  The EU’s regional aid program may be regarded as 
financial compensation for the dislocations arising from economic 
integration.313  EU investment in Europe’s poorer regions has 
created jobs, funded local development projects, retrained 
displaced workers, and provided aid to farmers.314  
Notwithstanding the post-2009 economic downturn, the EU’s 
regional aid program has been remarkably successful, and has 
reduced incentives to migrate in search of better economic 
opportunities.315
Adjustment assistance from the United States would enable the 
Mexican government to reinvest in the agricultural sector, to target 
resources toward local and indigenous communities, and to protect 
the natural resource base necessary for food production.  Because 
the neoliberal economic policies of recent decades have deprived 
rural communities in Mexico and throughout the Global South of 
social safety nets, input subsidies, price supports, infrastructure, 
education, credit, insurance, and marketing assistance,
 
316
 
311 HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 253, at 288. 
 
312 See Canova, supra note 7, at 364–65 (describing the European Union’s 
Regional Assistance Program for countries awaiting EU membership). 
313 See id. at 366 (“One way to look at the EU regional aid program is as fiscal 
compensation to members for the dislocations arising from trade liberalization 
and a unified monetary policy and interest rate.”). 
314 See id. at 365 (describing the EU’s investments in poorer regions of 
Europe). 
315 See id. at 366 (discussing the impact of EU investment on Irish migration). 
316 See Ha-Joon Chang, Rethinking Public Policy in Agriculture: Lessons from 
History, Distant and Recent, 36 J. PEASANT STUD. 477, 480–81 (2009) (describing how 
the structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the World Bank led 
to the elimination or drastic reduction of state support for the agricultural sector); 
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investment in the agricultural sector must be a top priority.  
Indeed, a recent multi-stakeholder and multidisciplinary 
assessment of the agricultural sector initiated by the World Bank 
and by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization specifically 
recommended the redirection of investment toward the needs of 
small farmers as a means of reducing poverty, promoting food 
security, and protecting the environment.317
Adjustment assistance would benefit Mexicans living in urban 
areas by providing financing for infrastructure projects and for 
small and medium-sized enterprises, and would improve 
environmental quality by providing financing for environmental 
protection.  Like the European Union member states, the United 
States and Mexico could work toward the development of a 
common environmental policy; U.S. adjustment assistance could 
finance the harmonization and improvement of environmental 
standards and the strengthening of the institutions that implement 
and enforce environmental legislation.
   
318
The provision of adjustment assistance to Mexico would benefit 
the United States by promoting long-term prosperity in Mexico, 
improving environmental quality, reducing economic incentives to 
migrate, and decreasing social unrest and illegal business activities.  
Instead of criminalizing immigrants and militarizing the border, 
the United States would do well to emulate the European Union’s 
approach. 
 
6.4. Transparency and Participation in Trade Negotiations 
As the NAFTA case study illustrates, trade liberalization based 
on comparative advantage often results in serious human rights 
violations and environmental harm because market prices fail to 
 
Anuradha Mittal, The 2008 Food Price Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies, U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development, G-24 Discussion Paper, No. 56, 
UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/G24/2009/3, at 9–11 (June 2009) (explaining how 
structural adjustment in the developing world resulted in the under-investment in 
agriculture and rural development, particularly in Africa). 
317 INT’L ASSESSMENT OF AGRIC. KNOWLEDGE, SCI. & TECH. FOR DEV., 
AGRICULTURE AT A CROSSROADS: GLOBAL REPORT 379, 411, 497 (Hans R. Herren et 
al. eds., 2009).  
318 See Patrick J. Kapios, Environmental Enlargement in the European Union: 
Approximation of the Acquis Communautaire and the Challenges that it Presents for the 
Applicant Countries, 2 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2002) (explaining the 
European Union’s requirement that new members harmonize their environmental 
legislation with that of the EU). 
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reflect environmental and social externalities and because the 
communities most affected by trade reforms are not consulted.  
One legal reform that would facilitate the early identification and 
mitigation of such externalities is legislation requiring ex ante 
environmental and human rights impact assessment of all trade 
agreements.  This assessment should take place as early as possible 
in the negotiation process, and should be conducted in a 
transparent manner that involves extensive public participation 
and consultation.  
Environmental impact assessment emerged as a regulatory tool 
in the United States with the passage of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,319 and has since been adopted 
by most countries and by international organizations.320  The 
objectives of the assessment process are two-fold:  to ensure that 
the possible impacts of a proposed project are assessed before a final 
decision is made; and to inform the public and solicit meaningful 
public input on the costs and benefits of proceeding with the 
project.321
In the United States, Executive Order 13,141 (1999) already 
requires the environmental review of trade agreements.
  
322  
However, the executive order falls short of achieving 
environmental justice in numerous respects.  First, while review of 
environmental impacts in the United States is mandatory, review 
of global and transboundary impacts is discretionary.323  Second, 
the executive order does not require the review of the human 
rights impact of trade agreements.324  Third, the executive order 
does not provide for the periodic assessment of trade agreements 
already in place.325
 
319 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (1970).  
NEPA regulations are set forth at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1–1517.6 (1985). 
  Fourth, the executive order fails to prescribe 
the timing of the environmental review and does not require the 
320 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 533 (3d. ed. 2007). 
321 See id. at 531–34. 
322 See Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 16, 1999) (requiring 
environmental review for “(i) comprehensive multilateral trade rounds; (ii) 
bilateral or free trade agreements; and (iii) major new trade liberalization 
agreements in natural resource sectors”). 
323 See id. § 5(b) (providing that “[a]s appropriate and prudent, reviews may 
also examine global and transboundary impacts”). 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
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release of information to the public beyond the draft 
environmental review and the scope of the negotiation.326  Without 
access to draft negotiating texts, meaningful public participation is 
difficult to achieve.  Moreover, in the absence of specific guidance 
on the timing of the review, there is a danger that the review will 
be performed too late in the process to permit significant public 
input and consideration of alternatives, including the no-action 
alternative.327  Fifth, while the executive order does require that 
environmental reviews be “made available in draft form for public 
comment,”328 there is no mechanism to ensure that public 
comments are taken into account—such as requiring agency 
response to public comments.329  Sixth, the executive order does 
not require the disaggregation of impacts according to race, 
gender, ethnic origin, geographic region, or other variables.  In 
order to determine whether trade agreements will impose a 
disproportionate burden on specific segments of the population, 
disaggregation of data is essential.  Seventh, the executive order 
does not create a private right of action in case its terms are 
violated.330  Finally, the executive order does not make reference to 
Executive Order 12,898, issued five years earlier, which requires all 
federal agencies to make environmental justice part of their 
missions.331  Executive Order 12,898 inexplicably excludes the 
United States Trade Representative and the State Department from 
the interagency working group charged with its implementation.332
 
326 See James Salzman, Executive Order 13,141 and the Environmental Review of 
Trade Agreements, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 366, 372–73 (2001) (discussing the limits of 
Executive Order 13,141). 
  
In order to foster environmental justice at the international level, it 
327 See id. at 373–74 (“If NEPA is a guide, it should be early enough for 
meaningful consideration of alternatives to the negotiating objectives, including a 
no-action decision.”). 
328 See Exec. Order No. 13,141, supra note 322, § 5(a) (outlining the 
requirements for an environmental review). 
329 See Salzman, supra note 326, at 373 (noting that Executive Order 13,141 
does not require a response to public comments).  
330 See Exec. Order No, 13,141, supra note 322, § 7 (“This order is intended 
only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and does not 
create any right, benefit, trust, or responsibility, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law or equity . . . .”). 
331 See Exec. Order 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629, § 1-101 (Feb. 11, 1994) (“[E]ach 
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission . . . 
.”). 
332 See id. § 1-102 (discussing the creation of the Interagency Working Group). 
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is essential to include environmental justice in the mission of these 
government agencies and to involve them in the interagency 
dialogue over the implementation of this mission.   
Despite the limitations of Executive Order 13,141, ex ante 
environmental and human rights impact assessments, if properly 
designed, have the potential to provide decision-makers and the 
public with valuable information about the environmental and 
human rights impacts of trade agreements, to prevent the 
“capture” of the negotiation process by commercial interests, to 
enhance government accountability, to create a forum for public 
input, and to democratize trade policy by fostering informed and 
reasoned debate.333
In addition, it would be advisable to require periodic ex post 
environmental and human rights impact assessments of trade 
agreements several years after their entry into force and to include 
“sunset clauses” in trade agreements akin to Article 20 of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture
  The participation of rural and indigenous 
communities in the impact assessment process is vitally important 
so that the assessment will be informed by the knowledge and 
experience of those most affected by agricultural trade policy.  
Such participation also yields trade agreements that are perceived 
as more legitimate because they are the product of an inclusive 
political process. 
334 so as to require renegotiation of trade 
agreements in light of these ex post impact assessments.335
In the case of NAFTA, for example, analysis and public 
disclosure of the negative externalities associated with industrial 
  The 
periodic assessment and revision of trade agreements will enable 
decision-makers and the public to identify the long-term and 
indirect impacts of trade agreements and to make sure that these 
agreements are continuously revised and improved in order to 
promote human rights and environmental protection.  
 
333 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Impact Assessment in Post-Colonial 
Societies: Reflections on the Proposed Expansion of the Panama Canal, 4 TENN. J. L. & 
POL’Y 303, 353 (2008) (enumerating the benefits of the environmental impact 
assessment process). 
334 See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 20, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S 410 
(“Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in 
support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, 
Members agree that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated one 
year before the end of the implementation period . . .”). 
335 See De Schutter, supra note 255, at 25 (discussing the importance of ex post 
assessments of trade and investment agreements). 
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corn production in the United States and of the positive 
externalities associated with traditional corn cultivation in Mexico 
might generate public pressure for regulatory reform or some form 
of financial compensation.  Industrial corn production in the 
United States contributes to a wide range of environmental and 
human health problems, including water pollution, water scarcity, 
biodiversity loss, climate change, pesticide poisoning, and a 
growing epidemic of obesity and Type II diabetes due to the 
presence of high fructose corn syrup in numerous food products.336
Regulatory reform in the United States could involve amending 
the statutes that currently exempt all but the largest farms from the 
nation’s environmental laws or redirecting subsidies away from 
industrial agriculture and toward healthier and more sustainable 
farming practices.
   
In Mexico, by contrast, the biodiverse cultivation techniques of 
indigenous and rural communities provide positive environmental 
and social externalities.  If these issues are discussed in public 
hearings in Mexico and the United States, it may be possible to 
create the interest convergence necessary to overcome the 
economic power of agribusiness and to achieve genuine reform. 
337  Regulatory reform in Mexico might involve 
rewarding small farmers for the positive social and environmental 
contributions of traditional corn production by providing 
payments for ecosystem services.  These payments could be 
funded by tariffs on U.S. corn or by direct payments from the 
United States for the protection of rural livelihoods and for the 
conservation of a public good of global significance—Mexico’s 
genetic diversity.338
 
336 See generally Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon and Conservation: Rethinking 
U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
593, 595–614 (2010) (discussing the environmental and human health impacts of 
industrial corn production in the United States); George A. Bray et al., 
Consumption of High-Fructose Corn Syrup in Beverages May Play a Role in the 
Epidemic of Obesity, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 537, 537–43 (2004). 
   
337 See Angelo, supra note 336, at 642–55 (providing recommendations for 
regulatory changes); William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing 
Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 248–51, 300–08 (2009) (proposing environmental and farm 
bill reforms to address the deleterious environmental and human health 
consequences of industrial agriculture and to promote healthier and more 
environmentally friendly alternatives).  
338 While a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of payments for 
ecosystem services is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to emphasize 
the critical role of participation by small farmers and indigenous communities in 
the design and implementation of any payment scheme to ensure that these 
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6.5. Reducing North-South Inequality: Policy Space for Development 
An environmental justice approach to trade policy seeks to 
reduce the structural inequities in global economic relations that 
impose a disproportionate share of the burdens of globalization on 
developing countries and on vulnerable populations within those 
countries.339  As the NAFTA case study illustrates, trade 
liberalization based on comparative advantage has often relegated 
developing countries to poverty by locking them into economically 
and ecologically disadvantageous specialization in agro-export 
production or low-wage, low-skill assembly plants and by 
precluding them from creating comparative advantage in more 
dynamic economic sectors.  Even if small farmers in Mexico are 
compensated for providing ecosystem services and if the most 
egregious inequities in the agricultural chapter of NAFTA and in 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture are moderated, the current 
WTO framework constrains the ability of developing countries to 
utilize many of the protectionist development strategies 
historically deployed by wealthy countries to achieve a stable, 
prosperous and diversified economic base.340
An environmental justice approach to trade policy must 
recognize and give effect to the right to development articulated by 
the U.N. General Assembly in its 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
Development
 
341 and subsequently reaffirmed in Principle 3 of the 
Rio Declaration.342
 
payments achieve both poverty alleviation and natural resource conservation.  For 
an analysis of the conflicting objectives and priorities of Mexico’s existing 
payment for ecosystem services programs, see Kathleen McAfee & Elizabeth N. 
Shapiro, Payments for Ecosystem Services in Mexico: Nature, Neoliberalism, Social 
Movements, and the State, 100 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 579 (2010). 
  The Declaration on the Right to Development 
proclaims the right to development as an “inalienable human 
right,” and imposes on states “the duty to co-operate with each 
339 See Gonzalez, supra note 246, at 628–36 (stating that mitigation of North-
South inequality is one of the goals of environmental justice at the international 
level and analyzing the legal doctrines available to achieve this objective). 
340 See YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM 9–13, 156–65 (2006) (stating that the current international trade framework 
has “put roadblocks on the path of development for many, if not most, 
developing countries” and proposing a more development-friendly approach to 
the regulation of international trade). 
341 See G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, UN GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/41/128, art. 1 (Dec. 4, 1986) [hereinafter Declaration on the Right to 
Development]. 
342 See Rio Declaration, supra note 306, princ. 3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/1
GONZALEZ.DOC 3/18/2011  3:16 PM 
2011] MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS 795 
other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to 
development” as well as “the duty to take steps, individually and 
collectively, to formulate international development policies with a 
view to facilitating the full realization of the right to 
development.”343
As Professors Ruth Gordon and Jon Sylvester point out, 
acknowledging a right to development implies conceding the 
obligation to provide financial assistance to effectuate this right—
an obligation that wealthy countries have consistently rejected.
   
344  
Despite the Global North’s disavowal of an explicit financial 
obligation, development has always been and continues to be the 
central objective of the Global South in the international trade 
regime.345
The 1947 GATT was widely perceived to favor wealthy 
countries over poor ones because it required reduction of tariffs on 
manufactured goods while permitting industrialized countries to 
limit or exclude textiles, clothing, and agricultural products from 
developing countries.
 
346
 
343 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 341, arts. 1(1), 3(3), 
4(1). 
  In response to these inequities, 
developing countries banded together to demand trade preferences 
in favor of Third World nations, including preferential market 
access and non-reciprocal tariff concessions, most of which proved 
ineffective because they were voluntary and could be withdrawn 
344 Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WISC. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 63–64 (2004). 
345 See Ruth Gordon, Contemplating the WTO from the Margins, 17 BERKELEY LA 
RAZA L.J. 95, 99 (2006) (explaining that poor nations joined the WTO “because 
they have been convinced, or forced to believe, that trade will be the answer to 
their development woes and that being outside of this regime will be 
economically fatal”). 
346 See LEE, supra note 340, at 107–11 (concluding that “the GATT made 
consistent efforts to reduce both tariff and non-tariff barriers to the manufactured 
products in which developed countries tend to have a competitive advantage but 
not those products in which developing countries have this advantage, such as 
agricultural products and textiles”); Gonzalez, supra note 67, at 441–45 (describing 
the various protectionist trade policies utilized by developed countries under the 
pre-Uruguay Round GATT, including tariffs, quantitative restrictions, agricultural 
export subsidies, and domestic agricultural subsidies); Faizel Ismail, Rediscovering 
the Role of Developing Countries in GATT Before the Doha Round, 1 L. & DEV. REV. 49, 
58–59 (2008) (discussing the impediments to developing country participation in 
the early GATT negotiation rounds and the ways in which the resulting trade 
rules disfavored developing countries). 
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at whim by developed countries.347  Despite several attempts to 
make the GATT more development-friendly by imposing 
asymmetrical obligations on developed and developing countries 
pursuant to the principle of special and differential treatment, the 
GATT failed to open up industrialized country markets to 
developing country products (clothing, textiles, and agricultural 
products) or to give developing countries sufficient flexibility to 
promote industrialization.348
The WTO, which succeeded the 1947 GATT, did not improve 
matters.  In exchange for enhanced market access for developing 
country textiles and agricultural products, developing countries 
agreed to the curtailment of asymmetrical obligations and 
undertook new obligations in a variety of areas that were of 
particular interest to industrialized countries (including intellectual 
property, services, and investment).
 
349  Like its predecessor, the 
WTO did not eliminate the trade barriers that excluded developing 
country products from industrialized country markets.350  
However, the WTO did succeed in restricting the ability of 
developing countries to use tariffs and subsidies to promote 
potentially dynamic industries and to protect these industries from 
more technologically advanced foreign competitors;351
 
347 See Ruth Gordon, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brave New World of the WTO 
Multilateral Trade Regime, 8 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 79, 89–91 (2006) 
(discussing the role of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
as the voice of Third World nations in international trade). 
 it also 
imposed a host of new and costly obligations on developing 
countries in the areas of intellectual property, services, and 
348 See LEE, supra note 340, at 26–39 (analyzing the shortcomings of the GATT 
provisions designed to facilitate development); Gonzalez, supra note 246, at 634–
35 (discussing the failure of special and differential treatment under the 1947 
GATT to advance the developmental aspirations of developing countries; Ismail, 
supra note 346, at 65–67 (describing GATT’s failure during its first eight rounds to 
balance reciprocity and the most favored nation principle with the special 
development needs of developing countries). 
349 See Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 291, 297 (2004) (“Developing countries lost the option of 
maintaining different levels of obligation and instead were granted additional 
periods of time to adjust to the burdens of fully implemented WTO obligations.”). 
350 See id. at 298 (noting that developed countries have maintained trade 
barriers in the sectors such as agriculture and textiles, which are of greatest 
importance to developing countries). 
351 See id. (explaining how the WTO deprived developing countries of market 
protections and of the flexibility to pursue development-oriented policies). 
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investment.352  At the end of the day, most developing countries 
came to regard the WTO as a bad bargain.353
In response to developing countries’ dissatisfaction with the 
WTO, the ministerial declaration that launched the Doha Round of 
WTO negotiations re-affirmed the commitment to special and 
differential treatment, and called for the review and strengthening 
of these provisions in order to make them “more precise, effective, 
and operational.”
 
354
Multilateral and bilateral trade agreements must expressly 
adopt and reinvigorate the principle of special and differential 
treatment by giving developing countries the “policy space” to 
utilize a variety of protectionist mechanisms to facilitate the 
transition from agro-export specialization and export processing to 
a more diversified economic base capable of generating reliable 
revenue streams.
 
355
 
352 See id. (arguing that developing countries undertook new obligations with 
clear and immediate costs in exchange for vague and unenforceable promises by 
developed countries to grant market access to developing country products); LEE, 
supra note 340, at 41–42 (explaining that “compliance with some of the WTO 
requirements . . . is costly and puts considerable burden on developing countries 
by requiring developing countries to divert scarce resources that should be 
invested elsewhere to meet more immediate economic needs”). 
  Only an asymmetrical set of trading rules that 
require relative market openness in wealthy countries while 
permitting certain forms of protectionism in poor countries can 
begin to alter the inequitable patterns of trade and production that 
foster environmental injustice in the Global South. 
353 See Garcia, supra note 349, at 297–98, 310 (concluding that the WTO was a 
bad bargain and explaining that “developing countries grew increasingly 
frustrated, judging that they had been tricked with respect to the extent of what 
they had been promised in the Uruguay Round”).  
354 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, para. 44, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) (reaffirming the 
commitment to special and differential treatment and agreeing that “all special 
and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational“). 
355 See LEE, supra note 340, at 156–60 (calling for special and differential 
treatment in accordance with each country’s level of development); Carmen G. 
Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical Reflections on 
Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 69 (2006) (arguing that 
developing countries must be permitted to “utilize the protectionist tools 
historically used by [industrialized countries] to achieve economic diversification 
and industrialization”).  See generally PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2005) (suggesting strategies that developing 
countries might deploy to maximize the “policy space” for development). 
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6.6. Re-conceptualizing Development 
In addition to enhancing the ability of Third World nations to 
determine their own economic priorities, an environmental justice 
approach to trade policy must also question the development 
paradigm that undergirds the international trade regime356
At the heart of virtually all development theories is the notion 
that the Third World should abandon traditional lifestyles and 
beliefs and adopt First World norms and values.
 and 
embrace alternative conceptions of a just and sustainable society. 
357  In its most 
recent incarnation, development is linked to privatization, export-
led growth, and trade liberalization in accordance with the dictates 
of comparative advantage.358  Development presupposes the 
inferiority of non-Western peoples and prescribes “modernization” 
as the only path to a better life.359  In so doing, the contemporary 
development discourse represents a natural extension of its 
colonial predecessor that undertook the paternalistic task of 
“civilizing” the “natives.”360
Indigenous peoples have long resisted misguided development 
projects that threaten their livelihoods, beliefs, traditions, and ways 
of life.
   
361
 
356 See Gordon, supra note 345, at 99 (discussing the centrality of the 
development paradigm to economic globalization). 
  Indigenous organizations have denounced globalization 
as a “second conquest” whereby Northern and Southern states, in 
357 See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 344, at 15–17 (critiquing development 
theories because at their core they push Third World countries to abandon 
traditions and follow in the footsteps of the West). 
358 See id. at 44–48 (explaining that development became synonymous with  
economic liberalization, privatization, and the free market system after the demise 
of the Soviet Union); Gordon, supra note 345, at 99–100 (describing the firm link 
between trade liberalization based on comparative advantage and the 
contemporary development discourse). 
359 See Gordon, supra note 345, at 107 (pointing out that “development 
supposes some deficiency that must be corrected” and “assumes that a particular 
kind of modernization is the inevitable course that all nations and peoples must 
pursue”). 
360 See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 344, at 77–78 (concluding that the 
assumptions underlying the contemporary development discourse represent “a 
natural extension of a colonial discourse that emphasized Third World cultural, 
political, social and racial inferiority and justified itself, in part, by a paternalistic 
mission to uplift and civilize the natives”). 
361 See JUNG, supra note 25, at 208 (arguing that “[f]rom the indigenous 
perspective, globalization is represented as a threat to the livelihood of 
indigenous communities, as well as to the preservation of their traditions, beliefs, 
and ways of life”). 
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collaboration with the WTO, the IMF, and other economic 
organizations, continue to displace indigenous peoples in order to 
appropriate their lands, resources, and knowledge.362  Indigenous 
peoples, as a matter of self-determination, demand to determine 
their own economic, social, environmental, and cultural priorities 
rather than being forced to ”develop” in ways dictated by the 
dominant society.363
A post-development paradigm grounded in environmental 
justice must recognize the duty of states to respect, protect, and 
fulfill the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination and to 
prevent the destruction or dispossession of indigenous lands 
whether by market forces, climate change, or other factors.
 
364  
Relocating indigenous communities to urban areas or to other 
countries in order to help them “adjust” to trade liberalization is 
not an acceptable option.  As Professor Rebecca Tsosie points out, 
“[h]istory has demonstrated time and again that the forcible 
removal of indigenous communities from their traditional lands, 
resources, and lifeways results in immeasurable harm.”365  Rather 
than attempting to relocate or compensate indigenous peoples for 
potentially irreparable harm to their lands, livelihoods, and ways 
of life, states entering into trade agreements must be mindful of the 
rights of indigenous nations within their border, and must ensure 
that these agreements do not undermine these rights.366
Recognizing alternative development paradigms is the first 
step toward re-conceptualizing development more generally.  The 
promise of globalization is premised on the possibility of unlimited 
 
 
362 See id. at 208–09 (discussing the view of some indigenous activists that 
globalization constitutes a new form of colonialism “in which heavily indebted 
developing countries were powerless to prevent exploitation of their natural 
resources, to insist on favorable terms of trade for their export products or to 
protect the rights of their citizens”); LAURA WESTRA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 64–65 (2008) (arguing that globalization represents a “second 
conquest” of indigenous peoples “whereby states and trade and economic 
organizations form an almost unbeatable ‘holy alliance’”). 
363 See, e.g., WESTRA, supra note 362, at 89 (discussing the struggles of 
indigenous communities in Guatemala to resist World Bank-financed mining 
projects). 
364 See Tsosie, supra note 17, at 1633–43 (discussing the ways in which climate 
change threatens indigenous self-determination). 
365 Id. at 1645. 
366 See id. at 1663 (discussing the duty of nation-states to respect the rights of 
indigenous peoples in developing environmental policy). 
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economic growth.367  However, the resource-intensive, growth-at-
any-cost economic model pioneered by the Global North and 
exported with missionary zeal to the rest of the world threatens to 
overwhelm the carrying capacity of the planet’s ecosystems and to 
provoke global environmental catastrophe.368  While climate 
change is perhaps the most well-known example of economic 
activity exceeding ecological limits, there are countless additional 
examples, including unprecedented extinction of species; 
widespread chemical contamination of land, air, water, and human 
bodies; grave shortages of freshwater; and rapid degradation and 
desertification of agricultural lands.369  Even if ecosystem limits 
were not being exceeded, persistent poverty and widening social 
inequality raise serious questions about the benefits of the trade-
based development paradigm for the world’s poorest nations.370
A post-development paradigm must recognize the urgent need 
for creativity and local experimentation if we are to develop 
alternative approaches that integrate social, economic, and 
environmental justice.  The current development paradigm is being 
contested by social movements such as the Zapatistas and by 
scholars writing in a variety of disciplines.
 
371
6.7. Mitigating the Power of Transnational Corporations 
  It is essential to 
acknowledge the harm that this paradigm has inflicted on 
indigenous peoples, on the world’s poorest nations, and on the 
global environment if we are to promote alternatives that respect 
human life, human dignity, and the health of the planet. 
An environmental justice approach to trade policy must 
acknowledge the fallacy of perfect competition in international 
agricultural trade, and must take steps to discipline the 
 
367 See Gordon, supra note 345, at 110 (“[U]nderlying the promise of 
globalization is an unquestioned belief in unlimited growth.”). 
368 See Gonzalez, supra note 24, at 1002–04 (discussing the ways in which 
global economic activity has exceeded ecological limits).  
369 See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: 
CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY 1–9 
(2008) (describing the many ways that the global economy is “undermining the 
planet’s ability to sustain life”). 
370 See Gordon, supra note 345, at 109 (challenging the view that if developing 
nations adhere to the neoliberal paradigm, development will follow). 
371 See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 344, at 73–98 (discussing the social 
movements and the critical scholars who are contesting the development 
paradigm).   
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oligopolistic behavior of transnational agribusiness.  Supported by 
decades of government subsidies, the multinational grain traders, 
seed manufacturers, agrochemical companies, and supermarket 
chains utilize their unprecedented market power to manipulate 
market prices to their advantage at the expense of small farmers 
and consumers in both affluent and poor nations.372  These 
agribusiness giants increase rural poverty by placing downward 
pressure on the prices paid to farmers for their agricultural output 
while simultaneously charging high prices to consumers.373  They 
also use their considerable political and economic clout to 
persuade policy-makers in the Global North to demand greater 
access to developing country markets in trade negotiations while 
maintaining lavish agricultural subsidies at home.374
Aggressive enforcement of antitrust legislation is necessary to 
mitigate the economic power of transnational agribusiness.  The 
United States Department of Justice has taken an important first 
step by launching an antitrust investigation of the seed industry 
and examining lack of competition in agricultural markets more 
generally.
 
375  The European Parliament recently followed suit by 
adopting a declaration asking the European Commission to 
address the abuse of market power by large supermarket chains.376
 
372 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra note 234, 
para. 9 (concluding that the power imbalances in the food chain are detrimental to 
both consumers and producers and must be corrected); MURPHY, supra note 234, at 
21–29, 32 (providing an overview of the rapidly changing commercial context of 
agricultural production); PATEL & MEMARSADEGHI, supra note 94, at 34–36 
(discussing the negative impact of integrated food systems under corporate 
control on small farmers); ROSSET, supra note 234, at 45–51 (arguing that corporate 
domination of the food supply is harmful to farmers and consumers). 
 
373 See Olivier De Schutter, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains: The Role of Competition Law in 
Tackling the Abuse of Buyer Power, 2–3, Briefing Note 03 (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/component/content/article/1-latest-
news/1024-briefing-note-addressing-concentration-in-food-supply-chain 
[hereinafter Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains] (examining the 
adverse effects of buying power on producer prices). 
374 See ROSSET, supra note 234, at 41–51 (discussing how subsidies and market 
concentration aggravate the problem of export dumping). 
375 See William Neumann, A Growing Dissent: Rapid Rise in Seed Prices Draws 
Government Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at B1 (discussing the Justice 
Department’s antitrust investigation of the seed industry). 
376 See Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains, supra note 373, at 1 
(“[T]he European Parliament recently adopted a declaration requesting the 
European Commission to address ‘the abuse of power by large supermarkets 
operating in the European Union.’”). 
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However, given the global scope of the problem, it is 
imperative that states collaborate in the development and 
implementation of human rights-sensitive competition regimes.  
Competition law generally focuses on maximizing consumer 
welfare and fails to address the impact of market concentration on 
small producers.377  However, those most affected by corporate 
abuse of market power are often small farmers in the Global South 
whose subsistence rights are jeopardized.378  In order to effectively 
regulate anti-competitive conduct and to protect the human rights 
of indigenous and local rural communities, competition regimes 
must protect producers as well as consumers from the 
concentrated market power of commodity buyers, food processors, 
and retailers.379  Furthermore, the globalization of food markets 
requires the development of transnational legal regimes 
commensurate in geographic reach with the economic activities 
that they regulate.380  These legal regimes must be enforced by 
competent and independent competition authorities.381
7. CONCLUSION 
  North-
South collaboration is essential in order to challenge the 
dominance of corporate agribusiness in the world food system. 
The NAFTA case study illustrates the importance of grounding 
trade policy in social, economic, and ecological reality and being 
mindful of the limitations of the theory of comparative advantage.  
The agricultural sector in the Global South is in severe crisis, and is 
producing a flood of migrants—initially to urban areas ill-
equipped to provide jobs, housing, and other necessities and, 
ultimately, to the United States and other wealthy countries.  This 
rural exodus is fracturing families, exacerbating urban poverty, 
producing social unrest, and threatening the physical, cultural, and 
 
377 See id. at 3–4 (arguing that the consumer welfare standard does not take 
into account the potential harms suffered by small farmers despite the fact that 
they are most affected by excessive concentration in global food chains). 
378 See id. at 4 (arguing that corporate abuses of market power lead to few 
alternatives for poor farming populations). 
379 See id. at 4–5 (arguing that it is necessary for developing countries to put in 
place human rights-sensitive competition regimes). 
380 See id. at 4 (“The globalization of the food supply chains requires that 
competition law regimes be given extraterritorial reach, commensurate with the 
scope of activities of the market actors concerned.”).  
381 See id. at 5 (examining the ways in which the creation and abuse of market 
power by global agribusiness firms can be addressed in competition law). 
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spiritual survival of indigenous peoples.  It is also jeopardizing the 
world’s genetic diversity, and facilitating the replacement of 
environmentally friendly farming systems with cultivation 
techniques that deplete aquifers, contaminate water supplies, 
expose humans and wildlife to toxic agrochemicals, exacerbate 
global warming, and encroach upon forests and ecological 
reserves.  Instead of criminalizing immigrants and calling for 
increased militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border, it is important 
to recognize the relationship between international trade and 
migration, and to develop just and humane policy alternatives that 
will support the livelihoods of the world’s local and indigenous 
rural populations and protect the planet’s finite natural resources. 
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